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ABSTRACT 
 
By 1947, the conflicting national aspirations of the Arab majority and Jewish minority 
within Palestine had developed into an intractable problem. The responsibility for the 
political future of Palestine fell upon the fledgling United Nations and thereby 
weighed upon the shoulders of all its constituent states. This was a time, however, 
when the nations of the globe were emerging from the shadow of a world war, and 
were re-evaluating their construction of foreign policy. In this thesis I utilise the 
Palestine Question as a prism through which to explore the nuances in the Australian 
conception of postwar diplomacy.  
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Introduction 
 
 
The Palestine Question arrived at the steps of the United Nations (UN) in April 1947, 
after the British Government came to the firm conclusion that it was incapable of 
solving the conflict between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine, over which the British 
had had been given a mandate by the League of Nations.
1
 Widely regarded as an 
intractable problem, the international deliberation on the political future of Palestine 
was an early test of the capabilities of the newly created world body and the extent to 
which the principles advocated in its creation could, and would, be applied to a real 
life conflict.
2
 This period marked a unique juncture at which pronounced 
internationalist fervour following the end of World War Two intersected with the 
looming threat of another conflict of global proportions and repercussions that was the 
Cold War. The creation of the UN itself embodied the beginning of a new approach to 
international relations, based on multilateral diplomacy, designed to address such 
global challenges facing peace.
3
 How the constituent nations of the UN would choose 
to incorporate this new approach into their national foreign policies remained to be 
seen. This thesis examines Australia‘s involvement in the Palestine Question in order 
to reassess its place in the history of Australian postwar foreign policy. In particular, 
my focus is on what this involvement reveals about larger foreign policy themes that 
are of concern to historians of Australian politics, namely the changing relationship of 
                                                 
1 The term ‗Palestine Question‘ is derived from the name of the ‗Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian  
Question‘ that was established in 1947. In this thesis, the ‗Palestine Question‘ refers to the period 
between 1947–1949, from the point at which Britain indicated it would hand over the consideration of 
the political future of Palestine to the UN until the conclusion of the 1949 session of the UN.  
2 Carl Herman Voss, ‗Palestine: Acid Test of the United Nations‘, Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, vol. 258 (July 1948). 
3 Glenda Sluga, ‗Was the Twentieth Century the Age of Great Internationalism?‘, The Hancock 
Lecture 2009, published in The Australian Academy of Humanities, Proceedings (2009), p. 157.  
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Australian foreign policy to British and American foreign policy aims, and, a question 
that those same historians rarely ask: what influence did the creation of the UN have 
on the development of Australian foreign policy?
4
  
 
The Australian involvement in the Palestine Question was an early episode in 
Australia‘s foray into the international sphere but it has not been significantly 
discussed in analyses of the development of a postwar foreign policy. Scholars who 
document Australia‘s early participation in the United Nations have failed to evaluate, 
or even recount, Australia‘s involvement in the situation in Palestine. For instance, 
Norman Harper and David Sissons in Australia and the United Nations, fleetingly 
mention Palestine as a problem that Australian diplomats believed had been justly 
resolved.
5
 Harper and Sissons, however, do not examine the key role Australian 
policy makers played in the UN discussions on Palestine. Comprehensive works that 
address the liberal internationalist nature of the Chifley Labor Government (1945–
1949) that was in power throughout the duration of the Palestine Question have also 
failed to give more than a passing mention to Palestine. Ian Cumpston‘s seminal 
History of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1991 refers to the Palestine Question only 
to establish a brief background to the Suez crisis of 1956, and even then, there is no 
indication that Australia was involved.
6
 Peter Edwards, in Prime Ministers and 
Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1949, cites Palestine as an 
example of ―the reference of international issues to organs of the United Nations‖ 
                                                 
4 Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga, ‗New Histories of the United Nations‘, Journal of World History, 
vol. 19, no. 3 (September 2008), p. 252. Sluga and Amrith argue that the history of the UN has been 
underutilised as a source of enrichment for diverse historiographies.  
5 Norman Harper and David Sissons, Australia and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan 
Publishing Company, 1959), p. 278. 
6 Ian M. Cumpston, History of Australian Foreign Policy 1901—1991, Vol. 2, (Canberra:  Union 
Offset, 1995), p. 211. 
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which he argues ―became a theme‖ of Australian foreign policy.7 Edwards, however, 
fails to expand on this, and states only that Australians played a part in the creation of 
Israel.
8
 Other works such as Alan Watt‘s renowned study of Australian foreign policy, 
Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy: 1938—1965 and Christopher Waters‘ The 
Empire Fractures: Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s, fail to address Palestine at 
all.
9
 This is despite the fact that both Watt and Waters are particularly interested in 
points of conflict between Australian and British diplomats, which were numerous 
throughout the duration of the Palestine Question. Evidently, Palestine has not been 
regarded as a sufficiently significant episode for the analysis of Australian foreign 
policy although, as I will show, it has much to tell us about the relationship of 
Australia to the British and to the UN in the immediate postwar era. 
 
To the extent that there is a literature on Australia‘s involvement in the Palestine 
Question, it occurs in studies of Dr H. V. Evatt, the Australian Minister for External 
Affairs from 1941–1949.10 Evatt was deeply involved in the Palestine Question; in his 
own book, The Task of Nations, Evatt dedicates four chapters to Palestine, and he 
himself regarded his role in the admission of Israel to the United Nations as one of his 
greatest achievements.
11
 Most of his biographers, however, treat the Palestine 
Question as a prism through which to analyse his personal ambitions, rather than his 
foreign policy goals. For example, Kylie Tennant‘s Evatt: Politics and Justice only 
                                                 
7 Peter G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901—
1949 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 172.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Alan Watt, Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938—1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1967); Christopher Waters, The Empire Fractures: Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s 
(Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 1995). 
10 Stewart Firth, Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2005), p. vii. 
11 Herbert Vere Evatt, Task of Nations (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), pp. 121–65; Max 
Freilich, Zion in Our Time: Memoirs of an Australian Zionist (Sydney: Morgan Publications, 1967), p. 
218. 
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bothers with Evatt‘s involvement on the Palestine Question to argue that he was 
inspired, above all, by an undying sense of justice for the ―six million Jews [that] had 
died in Europe.‖12 For instance, she details Evatt‘s insistence that Australia be a 
signatory on any UN decision to appoint a fact-finding committee on Palestine only to 
imply that his morality had motivated him to action in the wake of the Holocaust.
13
 
Embroiled in an attempt to illustrate this morality, Tennant tantalisingly hints at, and 
yet fails, to explore the underlying foreign policy principles behind Evatt‘s actions by 
ignoring, for example, Evatt‘s pertinent struggle to maximise the voice of smaller 
powers in the UN Charter. Alan Renouf, in his work, Let Justice Be Done: The 
Foreign Policy of Dr H.V. Evatt, similarly concludes that ―the explanation for Evatt‘s 
attitude [on Palestine] is justice.‖14 Both Tennant and Renouf draw reductive 
conclusions regarding Evatt‘s involvement in Palestine without exploring in detail the 
international discussion on the issue. 
 
Allan Dalziel, another early biographer of Evatt, hints a little more at the foreign 
policy implications of Australia‘s involvement in the Palestine Question. Dalziel 
notes that Evatt was proud of his contribution to the UN discussion of the problem 
although he ―clashed with the British Government and with the anti-Labor Opposition 
in the Australian Parliament.‖15 Such observations however, remain unexplored in 
Dalziel‘s text—like Tennant, he mentions such clashes to argue only that Evatt‘s 
commitment to the principle of justice overrode such concerns. Evatt‘s foreign policy 
views on Palestine are not of interest in these works; rather, Palestine is treated as a 
looking glass through which Evatt‘s personal motivations can be analysed. For 
                                                 
12 Kylie Tennant, Evatt: Politics and Justice (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1970), p. 218. 
13 Ibid., p. 211. 
14 Alan Renouf, Let Justice Be Done: The Foreign Policy of Dr H.V. Evatt (St. Lucia: University of 
Queensland Press, 1983), p. 247. 
15 Alan Dalziel, Evatt: The Enigma (Sydney: Landsdowne Press, 1967), p. 9. 
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instance, Peter Crockett in Evatt: A Life presents a less favourable account of Evatt by 
drawing on the Palestine Question. He argues that Evatt at one stage adopted the 
American position towards Palestine ―in order to win support for his election the 
following year to the presidency of the General Assembly.‖16  
 
Daniel Mandel‘s H. V. Evatt and the Establishment of Israel: The Undercover Zionist 
presents a more nuanced view of Evatt‘s role in Palestine by focussing only on the 
Palestine Question.
17
 Mandel‘s comprehensive work is a crucial source for this thesis 
as he carefully details the proceedings of the various UN committees established to 
address the issue of Palestine. His ultimate conclusions are, however, that Evatt was 
motivated by his support for Zionism as well his overriding sense of personal 
ambition.
18
 In formulating such a conclusion, Mandel follows a relatively discernible 
pattern: he documents the clashes between Australian diplomats and their British and 
American counterparts, and identifies the resultant benefits for the Zionists as well as 
the authority subsequently accorded to Evatt. Like Evatt‘s other biographers, 
Mandel‘s work progresses from the underlying assumption that Evatt acted in an 
independent capacity and that his own concerns permeated through other diplomatic 
considerations. 
 
Another significant secondary source on the history of the Australian involvement in 
the Palestine question is Chanan Reich‘s Australia and Israel: An Ambiguous 
                                                 
16 Peter Crockett, Evatt: A Life (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 229. 
17 Daniel Mandel, H.V.Evatt and the Establishment of Israel: The Undercover Zionist (London: Frank 
Cass Publishers, 2004). 
18 Zionism is ethereal belief that Eretz Yisrael (the Land of Israel) is the rightful homeland of the 
Jewish people. It was transformed into a practical political movement by Theodore Herzl who 
convened the first World Zionist Congress in 1897. 
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Relationship.
19
 Its overall purpose is to trace the contours of Australian–Israeli 
relations from 1915–1967 by looking at Australian political, religious and media 
opinion on Israel. Reich‘s book provides less detail on the intricacies of the UN 
discussions on the Palestine Question than is found in Mandel‘s work but is useful in 
that it is not a biography of Evatt. As a result, he provides a greater emphasis on the 
overarching principles of the Department of External Affairs. Despite this, being a 
text concerned mainly with the bilateral relations between Australia and Israel, Reich 
ignores the foreign policy implications of Australia‘s involvement in the Palestine 
Question for Australia‘s relations with the UK, the US and the UN.  
 
In this thesis, I also look at the Palestine Question through an analysis of Evatt. 
Although he is not the focus of my study, his role is examined on the grounds that he 
undeniably played a crucial part in spearheading an Australian Palestine policy. 
Whilst Evatt may have had personal ambitions that shaped his judgements, I contend 
that this was but one deciding factor. I provide a new context in which to investigate 
the creation of an Australian Palestine policy by looking at the Australian 
understanding of the significance of the international sphere. In doing so, I argue that 
Evatt also acted as the Minister for External Affairs and that his actions, therefore, 
reflected key principles of the emerging Australian postwar foreign policy. Whilst 
existing studies of Australia‘s involvement in the Palestine Question discuss the 
Australian relationships with the UK, the US and the UN only to provide background 
context to their main preoccupations, I will use the Palestine Question to bring these 
relationships to the fore. 
 
                                                 
19 Chanan Reich, Australia and Israel: An Ambiguous Relationship (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 2002).  
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In this thesis, I examine the actions of diplomats within the Australian Department of 
External Affairs in order to ascertain the underlying principles of foreign policy that 
they reflect. This first requires an understanding of the agency such diplomats could 
exert and the way in which External Affairs functioned. Consensus has developed 
amongst historians that following Evatt‘s inheritance of the ministerial helm on 6 
October 1941, the department became his own personal fiefdom where he reigned 
supreme.
20
 Whilst Evatt dominated the construction of foreign policy, however, his 
views were not without implicit support from his Government and his Department. 
Chifley‘s biographer has argued, for instance, that Evatt and Chifley shared 
―substantial identity of aim.‖21 It will be seen that where Chifley had any particular 
standpoint on an issue on the Palestine Question, Evatt was duly informed.
22
 As 
Edwards argues, Evatt‘s ‗free hand‘ in foreign policy was based on Chifley‘s tacit 
support.
23
 Within External Affairs, although Evatt‘s subordinates were under his 
direct instruction, for the most part they too shared views aligned with that of their 
Minister. Two key Australian diplomats involved in the Australian consideration of 
the Palestine Question were John Hood, who was often the Australian representative 
on committees dealing with the Palestine Question, and John Burton, Secretary of the 
Department of External Affairs from 1947–50.24 Both Hood and Burton shared 
Evatt‘s belief, for example, that postwar diplomacy should be based not on the 
formation of blocs but on international cooperation through the UN.
25
 Frederic 
Eggleston, Evatt‘s legal advisor, had greater freedom to influence Evatt‘s 
                                                 
20 See, for example, Cumpston, History of Australian Foreign Policy, Vol. 1, p. 97; Edwards, Prime 
Ministers and Diplomats, p. 168. 
21 L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley: A Political Biography (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1961), p. 287. 
22 Rodney Gouttman, ‗First Principles: H.V. Evatt and the Jewish Homeland‘, in W.D. Rubenstein, ed., 
Jews in the Sixth Continent (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 263; A.W. Stargardt, Things Worth 
Fighting For–Speeches by Joseph Benedict Chifley (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1952), p. 
19. 
23 Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, p. 175. 
24 Mandel, H.V. Evatt and the Establishment of Israel, pp. 2–4. 
25 Ibid., p. 2. 
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perspective.
26
 He believed, like Evatt, that diplomacy should be predicated on the just 
resolution of conflict rather than principles of expediency or pragmatism.
27
 Thus, 
whilst the construction of foreign policy was largely spearheaded by Evatt, he was not 
acting on his own impulse, as scholars of the Australian involvement in the Palestine 
Question have assumed―rather, his views broadly reflected that of his Department 
and his Government.  
 
As Mandel writes, this set of diplomats including Chifley, Evatt, Burton and Hood, 
was as ‗internationalist‘ a group of policy makers as could be expected in the global 
climate of the 1940s.
28
 The Chifley Government rejected the idea that Australia‘s 
foreign policy should be directed by the United Kingdom.
29
 Rather, as Christopher 
Waters and Neville Meaney argue, the essence of the Chifley Government‘s foreign 
policy was the application of the principles of liberal internationalism aimed at the 
establishment of the foundations for world peace through diplomacy rather than 
power politics.
30
 
 
These internationalist policy makers expended much of their energy on cultivating 
and propagating an Australian perspective on the Palestine Question. This thesis seeks 
                                                 
26 Warren G. Osmond, Frederic Eggleston: An Intellectual in Australian Politics (Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 1985), p.xii. 
27 Mandel, H.V. Evatt and the Establishment of Israel, p. 2. 
28 Ibid., p. 15.  
29 David Lee, ‗The Curtin and Chifley Governments, Liberal Internationalism and World Organisation‘ 
in David Lee and Christopher Waters, eds., Evatt to Evans: the Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign 
Policy (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), p. 48; Carl Ungerer, ‗The ―Middle Power‖ Concept in 
Australian Foreign Policy‘, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 53, no. 4 (2007), pp. 540, 
542.  
30 Christopher Waters, ‗Creating a Tradition: The Foreign Policy of the Curtin and Chifley Labor 
Governments‘, in David Lee and Christopher Waters, eds., Evatt to Evans: the Labor Tradition in 
Australian Foreign Policy (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), p. 38; ; Christopher Waters, ‗The Great 
Debates: H.V. Evatt and the Department of External Affairs, 1941–49‘, in Joan Beaumont, Christopher 
Waters, David Lowe, Garry Woodard, eds., Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats: Australian Foreign 
Policy Making, 1941–1969 (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2003), pp. 48–9; Neville Meaney, 
‗Australia, the Great Powers and the Coming Cold War‘, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 
vol. 38, no. 3 (1992), p. 316–7; Lee, ‗Liberal Internationalism and World Organisation‘, p. 48. 
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to explore the reasons behind Australia‘s involvement in an affair far removed from 
her immediate strategic interests. At key moments, the Australian vision of a postwar 
world was manifest in the positions taken by these diplomats to the Palestine 
Question. The nuances of this vision, propagated by Evatt and his subordinates within 
External Affairs with the tacit support of the Chifley Government, will explored by 
examining the correspondence sent between the key Australian diplomats as well as 
that sent between those diplomats and their British and American counterparts. A key 
question this thesis will address is how External Affairs reconciled this vision of a 
postwar world with the traditional parochial concerns that marked Australia‘s pre-war 
policy. Was this new vision idealistic in nature, or did it accommodate Australian 
strategic interests? Why was this vision seen as the future for Australian foreign 
policy? These questions will be explored by tracing the key developments in the 
Palestine Question and the ways in which Australian diplomats engaged with, and at 
times avoided, the different issues raised. 
 
In order to provide the background from which the significance of the Australian 
engagement in the Palestine Question can be understood, the first chapter of this 
thesis begins by mapping out the prior involvement of Australia in the Middle East, 
with a specific focus on Palestine. It will demonstrate that World War Two 
highlighted the deficiencies in Australia‘s key alliances with the UK and the US, and 
became the crucible in which a distinctly Australian Palestine policy was born. I 
continue with an examination of the significance of the war for the broad underlying 
principles of Australian foreign policy by tracing the work of the Australian 
delegation at the 1945 United Nations Conference on International Organisation. 
From this basis, a study of the Palestine Question can help illuminate the extent to 
 14 
 
which Evatt‘s overall international philosophy influenced the practical construction of 
Australian postwar foreign policy. 
 
The second chapter follows Australia‘s involvement in the Palestine Question up until 
the historic 29 November 1947 General Assembly vote in favour of partition that 
established the legal basis for the creation of Israel. I will assess the extent to which 
the Australian involvement in the Palestine Question reflected the Australian 
conception of a ‗new world order‘ rather than any preordained views on Zionism or 
the plight of the Palestinian Arabs. This conception, manifest in the actions of 
members of External Affairs, will be contrasted with the British and the American 
understanding of international diplomacy that was expressed during discussions on 
the Palestine Question. In particular, I will look at the extent to which the UN affected 
Australia‘s relations with both the UK and the US and the way in which Australian 
diplomats viewed the role of the UN in the formation of Australian postwar policy. 
 
In my third and final chapter I will trace Australia‘s involvement in the Palestine 
Question after the partition decision of 29 November 1947. Following the UN ruling, 
vacillation from both of Australia‘s Great Power allies threatened the realisation of 
partition. I will show that there were distinct differences in the nature of Australian 
diplomacy towards both the UK and the US in the wake of the historic UN decision 
and I will account for them in the new ‗international‘ context that was gaining 
increasing importance at the time. From the developments in the Palestine Question, 
Australia emerged as a leader in the international discussion on Palestine and I will 
aim to discern why such leadership in the international forum was regarded by 
Australian diplomats as significant. 
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Essentially, this thesis reads the Australian involvement in the Palestine Question 
back into the history of Australian postwar foreign policy. By focussing on this early 
foray into international affairs, I seek to explore the way Australian foreign policy 
makers envisioned the future of international diplomacy in a postwar world. 
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Chapter I 
Australia, Palestine and the Australian Vision for the Postwar World 
  
The Australian involvement in the Palestine Question is somewhat surprising. A small 
nation with a population of only seven million, situated on the other side of the globe 
and with only a small Jewish lobby, for three years exerted considerable influence on 
the international discussion on the future of Palestine. This raises the question: why 
did Australian diplomats so adamantly demand a voice in regard to a conflict as 
intractable as that found in Palestine, when it did not directly impinge on Australia‘s 
domestic concerns? In seeking an answer to this question, the prior involvement of 
Australians in Palestine and the nature of Australian foreign policy following World 
War Two must first be understood. 
 
This chapter begins with a brief overview of Australia‘s involvement in the Middle 
East and Palestine prior to the hearing of the Palestine Question in the UN. Successive 
Australian Governments had very little to say on the development of the conflict in 
Palestine, except to agree on the necessity of strengthening the British position. As the 
storm clouds gathered over Europe in the prelude to World War Two, however, the 
Lyons Government (1932–1939) and the Menzies Government (1939–1941) became 
staunchly anti-Zionist based on the understanding that Jewish aspirations would 
threaten the stability of the British position.
31
 As I will show, it was only in the 
context of the vicissitudes of World War Two that the implications of the Australian–
British and Australian–American alliances entered the arena of Australian foreign 
                                                 
31 Reich, Australia and Israel, p. 8. 
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policy in the Middle East. The chapter traces the flowering of seeds of discontent with 
pre-war diplomacy and goes on to examine the extent to which Australian diplomats 
sought to find a solution in the embryonic United Nations. My main purpose here is to 
examine Australia‘s involvement in Palestine prior to 1947 in order to provide both 
background and contrast for the history of Australia‘s involvement in the Palestine 
Question from 1947–9. This contrast sharpens our view of the historically-specific 
underlying principles of Australian foreign policy during this short period, many of 
which were developed out of the crucible of World War Two.  
 
AUSTRALIAN PALESTINE POLICY 
International involvement in Palestine can be traced back to the beginning of the 
British Mandate over Palestine which was granted by the League of Nations in 1920 
and came into effect in 1923.
32
 The British, however, inherited not only land but also 
an intransigent conflict between two peoples aspiring to create a national home in 
Palestine: the Jews who had begun large scale immigration to Palestine at the end of 
the nineteenth century, and the Arab community already residing there.
33
  
 
Following the granting of the British Mandate, Australian policy makers had no 
discernible view on Palestine and the rising tensions in Palestine, other than 
wholehearted support for the British position.
34
 Although friendly relations had grown 
between the Australian soldiers stationed in Palestine and the Palestinian Jewish 
community during World War One, these did not develop political significance 
                                                 
32 Memorandum by His Britannic Majesty‘s Government presented in July, 1947, to the United Nations 
Special Committee on Palestine, The Political History of Palestine under British Administration 
(Jerusalem, 1947). 
33 The growth in Jewish immigration resulted from the increasing popularity of the Zionist movement 
following the convening of the first World Zionist Congress in 1897.  
34 Reich, Australia and Israel, p. 8. 
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following the war.
35
 For example, after a violent episode in 1928 in which the British 
Mandatory Government of Palestine used force to interfere in a Jewish ceremony at 
the religiously significant Wailing Wall, the Brisbane Jewish community called on the 
Australian Government to convey their protest to the British Government.
36
 As Reich 
shows, rather than doing so, the Australian Government forwarded the protest to the 
League of Nations.
37
 The League at this time, however, was regarded critically by the 
principal creator of foreign policy, Australian Prime Minister Stanley Bruce. Despite 
indicating hope for its future, in 1923 Bruce stated, ―Australia…does not think that 
the League…can ensure the peace of the world.‖38 The forwarding of the protest to 
the League was indicative of a disinclination to confront Britain and predicated on the 
belief that the League would be powerless to act on such protest. As Harper and 
Sissons argue, Australian policy makers gave primacy to the British Commonwealth 
rather than to the League as an effective source of security.
39
 Further, the Secretary of 
State for Dominion Affairs, Sir H. F. Batterbee was informed rather apologetically 
that in forwarding the protest to the League, Australian diplomats were ―merely acting 
as a post office in the affair.‖40 Clearly, policy makers were extremely reluctant to 
express a sentiment at variance with their British counterparts even though the Union 
of Sydney Zionists and the Melbourne branch of the Australasian Zionist Federation 
similarly requested that the Australian Government convey their protest to Britain.
41
  
 
                                                 
35 Chanan Reich, ‗Australia and the Jewish Community of Palestine‘, Values, Interests and Identity: 
Jews and Politics in a Changing World. Studies in Contemporary Jewry, An Annual, vol. 11 (1995), 
pp. 177–182. 
36 Reich, Australia and Israel, p. 7. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Cumpston, History of Australian Forein Policy 1901, p. 10. 
39 Harper and Sissons, Australia and the United Nations, p. 14. 
40 W.H to Batterbee, 1 March 1929, National Australian Archives, Canberra (hereafter AA), A981 Pal 
8, Part 1. 
41 Sampson to Bruce, 6 February 1929, AA A981 Pal 8, Part 1; Ward to Latham, 20 December 1928, 
AA A981 Palestine 8, Part 1.  
 19 
 
In the lead up to World War Two, the Australian Government began to formulate its 
own policy with regards to the Middle East. Bruce, now the Australian High 
Commissioner in Joseph Lyons‘ conservative Government, informed the British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 6 December 1938, ―we must not arouse the 
hostility of the Arabs in trying to pacify the Jews.‖42 Further on 14 February 1939, 
Lyons himself specified to the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, that 
Australia was firmly opposed to the partition of Palestine between the Arabs and the 
Jews which, he argued, would be ―politically unwise.‖43 This was an opinion forged 
in the context of the emerging major war; Australia‘s view was that Britain had to 
implement a scheme tolerable to the Arabs in order to avoid hostilities in the Arab 
Middle East.
44
 The British confirmed their rejection of partition on 17 May 1939, with 
the publication of a White Paper that heavily restricted Jewish immigration to 
Palestine and stated unequivocally that the partition of Palestine was against British 
policy.
45
 The arrival into government of the pro-British Robert Gordon Menzies and 
the emergence of World War Two saw Australian policy makers become even more 
zealous in promoting this position than the British. During the war, the stability of 
communications with Britain, which could be threatened if relations in the Middle 
East deteriorated, was considered to be of prime importance.
46
 Thus, Menzies himself 
sent a direct cable to the British firmly expressing these views after being informed by 
Bruce that such action would be ―helpful in stiffening their attitude.‖47 The crux of 
Australia‘s Middle East policy related to the role of the Middle East in the British 
                                                 
42 Note by Mr S. M. Bruce, High Commissioner in London, of Conversation with Lord Halifax, U.K. 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at the Foreign Office, 6 December 1938, in R.G. Neale, eds, 
Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (DAFP), Vol. 1 (Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1975), p. 525. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Riech, Australia and Israel, p. 10. 
45 Ibid., p. 12. 
46 Reich, ‗Australia and the Jewish Community of Palestine‘, p. 182. 
47 Bruce to Menzies, 3 December 1940, AA A981 Palestine 8, Part 6. 
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Imperial defence system.
48
 Although some diplomats, including Cyril E. Hughes, the 
Australian Trade Commissioner in Egypt, indicated sympathy for the plight of 
outnumbered Jews in Palestine, these opinions did not influence policy.
49
 Both the 
Lyons and the Menzies governments were of the view that the dictates of World War 
Two necessitated the strengthening of the British position and the maintenance of 
Imperial lines of communication; the conflict in Palestine was to be judged only with 
those factors in mind.  
 
Following Hitler‘s ascension to power in Germany in 1933, the emerging Jewish 
refugee problem exacerbated the conflict in Palestine and thus became a crucial 
concern of Britain.
50
 The Australian view on the issue was influenced by the racially 
discriminatory Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, otherwise known as the White 
Australia Policy.
51
 Although it was intended to prevent non-white immigrants from 
residing in Australia, a corollary of the policy was the need to maintain the racial 
homogeneity of Australia and thus the policy also became directed at other targets 
including Jews.
52
 As Paul Bartrop, one of Australia‘s foremost authorities on the 
Holocaust and anti-Semitism argues, this policy was discernible in Australia‘s 
participation in the July 1938 Evian Conference that was initiated by the US in order 
to discuss the establishment of a committee to facilitate the emigration from Austria 
and Germany of political refugees.
53
 At Evian, Australia‘s representative, Thomas 
                                                 
48 Fethi Mansouri, Australia and the Middle East: A Front-Line Relationship (London: Tauris 
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White, infamously indicated that ―Australia was not desirous of importing a racial 
problem by encouraging any scheme of large-scale foreign migration.‖54 Although 
Australia reluctantly agreed to accept a quota of refugees from Europe following the 
Evian Conference, intake was stopped by the outbreak of war.
55
 
 
After the Holocaust, the Chifley Government adopted a ‗humanitarian‘ Policy of 
Rescue which allowed up to 2000 survivors of the concentration camps who had 
family in Australia to be admitted into the country.
56
 This policy, however, attracted 
intense domestic criticism. Opponents of Jewish immigration questioned the wisdom 
of encouraging Jews to Australia at the expense of British settlers.
57
 Subsequently, the 
government made changes to severely limit the number of Jewish refugees arriving in 
Australia.
58
 The Australian reluctance to accept Jewish refugees both before and after 
the war puts paid to the contention of scholars such as Hilary M. Carey who argue 
that ―Jews had always been considered to be part of White Australia.‖59 It will be seen 
that the racially discriminatory policy of Australia towards Jewish refugees would 
play an important role in the construction of an Australian Palestine Policy once the 
Palestine Question was handed over to the UN.  
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WORLD WAR TWO 
During World War Two, cracks began to appear in the understanding of Australian 
foreign policy makers that Australian security was best supported by upholding the 
British position. As David Horner has explained, although Menzies declared that 
Australia was at war ―as a result‖ of Britain‘s declaration of war against Germany, he 
was not a ―blind, unthinking imperialist.‖60 Initially, Menzies attempted to delay the 
dispatch of Australian forces to the Middle East, as he sought reassurances from the 
British of their support against the rising Japanese threat in the Pacific.
61
 When he 
was instead informed that the British already had ships en route to collect Australian 
troops, he tartly responded, ―we resent being told that shipping is already on its 
way…there had been in this matter a quite perceptible disposition to treat Australia as 
a Colony…it is for the Government of Australia to determine whether and when 
Australian Forces shall go out of Australia.‖62 Despite the acrimonious exchange, by 
1941 the Menzies Government had committed three divisions of troops to the Middle 
East, and only one to Singapore which was regarded as Australia‘s main protection 
against Japanese invasion.
63
 In fact, the British had even announced in June 1940 that 
―if Japan threatened British interests in the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand would 
have to rely upon the United States to protect them.‖64 Clearly, although rifts were 
appearing in the Australian–British alliance, in these early stages of war, the Menzies 
Government still regarded the defence of the British position as the best possible 
defence for Australia. 
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As the war progressed, Australian diplomats began to dissociate Australian security 
from the British, and therefore the Middle East. There is a strong consensus amongst 
historians that the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 and the 
British surrender at Singapore on 15 February 1942 redefined Australian military 
strategy.
65
 This view is reinforced if we look at the Australian military involvement in 
the Middle East at this time. The day after the fall of Singapore, John Curtin, the new 
Labor Australian Prime Minister (1941–1945), known to be sympathetic to the 
American alliance, demanded that at least two Australian divisions return from the 
Middle East.
66
 A similar request made by Menzies following a siege of Australian 
troops in Tobruk had been refused earlier in the war by Churchill.
67
 However, when 
Churchill ordered the diversion of Australians to Burma, Curtin insisted, thereby 
forcing the capitulation of Churchill who grudgingly allowed the Australian troops to 
return home.
68
 As Horner notes, only by using the ―ultimate weapon of [the] denial of 
her forces‖ was a small country such as Australia was able to influence the strategic 
decisions of her Great Power allies.
69
 Evidently, as the war progressed, Australian 
military interests became increasingly dissociated from the British position. 
 
As Australian foreign policy makers began to focus on the war in the Pacific and the 
Japanese threat, the involvement of the Americans in the Pacific region became of key 
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importance. For instance, the month after the fall of Singapore, Evatt arrived in the 
US searching for a greater voice for Australia in the direction of the war effort.
70
 He 
successfully fought for the establishment of, and representation on, a War Council in 
Washington in order to discuss the offensive against Japan.
71
 In the exigencies of a 
war which threatened the territorial integrity of Australia, American engagement in 
the Pacific was indeed a source of reassurance. As Christopher Thorne notes, in 
March 1942 American General Douglas MacArthur was received in Australia as if he 
had ―come to save the maiden from the advancing dragon.‖72   
 
The lasting ramifications of World War Two for Australian–British and Australian–
American relations have been a subject of much debate. Scholars such as Michael 
Dunn and T.B. Millar have propagated a view that the British military defeats in the 
Pacific catalysed a shift in the orientation of Australian foreign policy from a reliance 
on Britain to a reliance on the United States as the guarantor of Australian security.
73
 
This view has since been severely tempered by historians who argue that such a shift 
was not permanent. Scholars such as Roger Bell have shown that as the Japanese 
threat receded, the Australian Labor Government was concerned with restraining the 
American influence in the Pacific following World War Two.
74
 For instance, the 
controversial 1944 Australian-New Zealand Agreement spearheaded by Evatt 
specified that a regional defence system would be based on Australia and New 
Zealand, and declared that any wartime installations made in the region by other 
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powers did not form the basis for territorial claims.
75
 The Agreement was a clear 
statement that the two countries were cautious about the intrusion of the US into the 
South Pacific.
76
 The same policy was sustained by the Chifley Government, as was 
evident through Evatt‘s refusal of a US request to use Manus Island in defensive 
installations in the Pacific, unless Australia could also jointly use other American 
bases in the region.
77
 Similarly, the American request to acquire Christmas Island was 
rejected.
78
 Indeed, consensus has since developed that, as David Lowe writes, ―the 
honeymoon [with the US] was short-lived.‖79  
 
The orthodox interpretation of Australia turning away from Britain has similarly been 
disputed by historians. David Day, for example, contends that whilst the events of 
World War Two did severely undermine the Australian–British relationship, this 
simply stimulated foreign policy makers to understand that ―all options were open, 
not just the British one.‖80 His contention that distinct Australian interests began to be 
formulated following World War Two is supported by Christopher Waters who 
argues that both the Curtin and Chifley Governments transformed the nature of the 
imperial relationship with the UK, and attempted to cultivate Australia‘s status as ―an 
independent player on the world stage.‖81 James Curran, however, takes issue with the 
understanding that an ‗independent‘ foreign policy emerged towards the end of the 
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war. He argues that loyalty to the British Empire remained intact and that World War 
Two had only demonstrated that Australia ―was part of a wider, dangerous world‖ in 
which security could only be found in alignment with British foreign policy.
82
 In 
Curran‘s view, it was both self-interest and a long-standing tradition of pro-British 
sentiment that led Australian policy makers to pursue greater involvement within the 
British Empire.
83
 The essential question, therefore, as Lowe pinpoints, regards the 
nature of Australia‘s involvement in postwar international relations: ―was he [Evatt] 
charting a new regional role for Australia in the Commonwealth or in the embryonic 
United Nations?‖84 In the following chapters I argue that at least in the case of the 
Palestine Question, the Chifley Government was more concerned with forging a role 
for Australia in the United Nations but that this did not preclude a desire to strengthen 
bilateral Australian–British relations.  
 
Historians such as Lowe and Watt concur that it was the Great Power disregard for 
Australian views that played a formative role in shaping Australia‘s postwar search 
for influence.
85
 Evatt himself recounted that ―it was with no little anxiety…[that] we 
watched the gradual development of political and territorial understandings and 
commitments between the Great Powers, regarding which the smaller nations had 
either not been adequately consulted or had not been consulted at all.‖86 For example, 
Australian concerns were not referred to during inter-Allied conferences held in 1943 
despite the fact that several of these broached Pacific issues.
87
 The Cairo Conference 
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which took place from 22–26 November 1943 is regarded by historians as a 
particularly pertinent episode which catalysed Australian thinking on postwar 
organisation. The conference, attended by Churchill, Roosevelt and China‘s Chiang 
Kai-Shek established, without consultation of Australia, that all of the islands in the 
Pacific seized by Japan since the beginning of the First World War would be taken 
from the nation.
88
  
 
Such wartime diplomacy fostered a concern amongst Australian foreign policy 
makers to ensure that the Australian voice would be heard. Again, this was reflected 
in the changes in Australia‘s Middle East policy following World War Two. An 
External Affairs assessment of the importance of the Middle East written in 1944, for 
example, spoke of the establishment of ―machinery that will make available to the 
Australian Government information on developments in the area as seen from a 
specifically Australian as well as more general British point of view.‖89 This need to 
establish a uniquely Australian view went hand in hand with the need to be able to 
influence affairs. Evatt himself stated in Parliament in September 1944 that the 
Australian Government intended to be involved in affairs in the region, including ―the 
future of the mandated territories of Palestine.‖90 This was to be achieved through 
seeking membership of any international organisations in which policy makers could 
―attempt to exert an appropriate influence in all fields of policy that may affect our 
interests.‖91 Following World War Two, Australian diplomats were no longer content 
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with receiving secondary information from their British counterparts but were looking 
to promote an independent Australian view in the international sphere.  
 
AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
The growing importance among External Affairs members of the expression of 
Australian opinion motivated the actions of the Evatt-led Australian delegation to the 
1945 United Nations Conference on International Organisation (UNCIO) held at San 
Francisco.
92
 The conference worked from the basis of the Dumbarton Oaks draft of 
the UN Charter which had been created by the Great Powers.
93
 The battles waged by 
Evatt and the Australian delegation to stress the Australian viewpoint in the final 
version of the UN Charter illuminated the Australian vision of the postwar world.  
 
At San Francisco, the Australian delegation attempted to both restrict the jurisdiction 
of the Security Council, comprising the Great Powers, and maximise that of the 
General Assembly, comprising all member states. One of the most significant 
campaigns of the Australian delegation at San Francisco was the battle to confine the 
use of veto in the Security Council to issues requiring enforcement action.
94
 The 
debate that ensued dichotomised proceedings; the Great Powers rejected the 
Australian proposal whilst considerable support for the Australian position was found 
among the smaller powers.
95
 Evatt was shocked, however, when discussions amongst 
the Great Power delegations revealed that were was a risk of a UN without the Soviet 
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Union, or of no UN at all.
96
 Although the campaign to confine the use of the veto was 
lost, the capitulation of the Australian delegation reflected the Australian prioritisation 
of a viable United Nations. It was clear that Australian diplomats envisioned a future 
in which Australia, within the forum of the UN, could gain influence as a leader 
amongst the smaller powers. For example, Evatt also championed a campaign to give 
the General Assembly the ―widest possible powers.‖97 The Dumbarton Oaks draft had 
specified that the General Assembly could consider ‗principles‘ and ‗questions‘ but 
that it could not make recommendations on specific cases and matters before the 
Security Council.
98
 By the end of deliberations, the Great Powers were forced to 
accept an Assembly with an almost unlimited scope, due to substantial work on 
Evatt‘s part.99 In seeking to minimise the powers of the Security Council and 
maximise that of the General Assembly, the Australian delegation to UNCIO and 
Evatt in particular, were forging for Australia a domain in which Australian interests 
could best be heard.  
 
 From the view of the Australian delegation, one of the major issues of the San 
Francisco Conference was the matter of domestic jurisdiction.
100
 The Australian 
delegation walked a fine line; despite demanding that the General Assembly have the 
―widest possible powers,‖ Australia was at pains to prevent the intrusion of the world 
body into domestic affairs. Thus whilst emphasising the responsibility of the Security 
Council to intervene in acts of aggression, the Australian delegation was concerned to 
ensure that the Security Council was not empowered to make recommendations to the 
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attacked state as to the cause of the dispute.
101
 Historians including Harper and 
Sissons as well as Hudson agree that the Australian delegation had had the White 
Australia Policy in mind when formulating their position.
102
 This is substantiated by 
the fact that Australian delegates specifically mentioned the issue of immigration in 
speeches made at the Conference as an example of an area in which the UN could 
have intervened were it not for the Australian amendments.
103
 By the end of 
deliberations, Evatt was indeed successful in widening the scope of the domestic 
jurisdiction principle.
104
 Clearly, the Australian position was to broaden the 
jurisdiction of the world body so far as to maximise the potential for Australian 
involvement whilst carefully restraining it in order to protect distinct Australian 
interests such as the White Australia Policy.  
 
Further, one of the key objectives of the Australian delegation at San Francisco was 
the expansion of the social and economic chapters of the Dumbarton Oaks draft.
105
 It 
was their view that peace could be attained through the removal of want; social and 
economic unrest was considered to be a cause of war.
106
 In line with this principle, 
Australia fought for and successfully secured the inclusion in the Charter of a 
provision that the countries of the UN should promote ―full employment‖ rather than 
―high and stable levels of employment,‖ the phrase advocated by the US.107 The same 
sentiment was behind the Australian delegation‘s espousal of the view that colonies 
should be placed under a scheme of trusteeship to ensure the advancement of all 
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colonial peoples on the basis of justice.
108
 This view that the resolution of 
international issues on principles of justice would achieve peace would later be 
influential in the participation of Australia in the Palestine Question.  
 
Meanwhile, by the end of World War Two, the British struggled to maintain their 
authority in Palestine. Tensions in the region escalated as both Arabs and Jews 
attempted to influence the British discussion on the political future of Palestine 
through acts of terrorism on British property.
109
 By the end of 1945, London had sent 
80,000 troops to Palestine in order to maintain the peace.
110
 It was evident that the 
British no longer had control of the situation in Palestine, and the cost of maintaining 
the Palestine Mandate was being questioned by the British public at large.
111
 Thus, the 
UK Government announced on 14 February 1947 that the determination of the 
political future of Palestine would be submitted to the UN for consideration.
112
 This, 
in effect, was the point at which the ‗Palestine Question‘ came to the fore of 
international politics. 
 
To sum up, Australian involvement in the Middle East and in Palestine prior to the 
beginning of the Palestine Question was only minor. In the 1920s there existed no 
Australian policy on the Palestine, and Australian diplomats were content to simply 
support the British position. However, as World War Two approached, policy makers 
began to articulate a concern to uphold the strength of the British Empire in order to 
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supplement the defence of Australia. Maintaining Arab support in the Middle East, an 
area of key strategic importance to Britain, was, therefore, regarded by Australian 
diplomats as necessary. Thus, these diplomats became more zealous than the British 
themselves in their defence of the British policy to thwart Jewish migration to 
Palestine.  
 
Further, from World War Two it was clear to Australian diplomats that both the pre-
war policy of adopting the UK position in international affairs and alignment with the 
US was insufficient to ensure that Australian interests would be considered. Thus, the 
Australian perception of the Middle East began to change, and no longer was the 
region of significance to Australia only vis-à-vis Britain‘s own geopolitical imperial 
interests. The Great Power disregard for Australian interests in the Pacific, evident in 
the series of Inter-Allied Conferences in 1943, indicated that a new forum needed to 
be found which would accommodate the views of Australia. The embryonic United 
Nations was regarded by Evatt as such a forum and thus the Australian delegation to 
UNCIO invested much of their energy in ensuring a role for smaller powers such as 
Australia in the construction of international policy. This was in itself a product of the 
broader thinking at the time; the San Francisco Conference was a high point in a wave 
of intellectual and popular anti-nationalist internationalism that had been brewing 
from the early 1940s.
113
 Through the Australian involvement in the Palestine Question 
it will be seen that the Chifley Government held a key conviction that the 
international sphere would best serve Australian interests.    
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Chapter II 
 
 The Road to Partition: 
 Tentative Steps in Australian Foreign Policy  
 
 
On 2 February 1947, Acting UN Secretary-General Victor Hoo received a letter from 
the British ambassador to the United Nations, Sir Alexander Cadogen, requesting that 
―the question of Palestine‖ be placed on the agenda of the next regular session of the 
UN, which was to be held in September of that year.
114
 To expedite the settlement of 
the issue, the British recommended that the Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, first 
summon an Ad Hoc Committee to undertake investigative work and then report to the 
regular session of the UN.
115
 Thus began the first test of the willingness of all the 
constituent nations of the UN to apply the principles of the UN Charter to a real life 
conflict.
116
 For the Chifley Government, the Palestine Question was part of an 
ongoing test of the form of internationalism Australia would take in the postwar era; 
would Australian foreign policy makers emphasise alliance diplomacy and power 
politics given the vested interests of her greatest ally, Britain, in Palestine, or would 
the Chifley Government stress the principles espoused by the Australian delegation to 
UNCIO?
117
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The Australian involvement in the Palestine Question began even before the case was 
officially heard in the UN. From the moment the British indicated that they wished to 
relinquish their responsibility for the determination of the political future of Palestine 
to the world body, Australian diplomats began to take tentative steps towards a 
foreign policy independent of the British. These tentative, independent steps 
illustrated the Australian understanding of postwar diplomacy. I argue that Australian 
diplomats sought greater participation of smaller nations in international affairs and 
that the UN was regarded as the most effective means to achieve this. For Australian 
policy makers, the world body offered the opportunity to cultivate foreign policy 
relationships and the means to influence international discussions to protect key 
domestic interests. 
 
PRE-UNSCOP 
It was on 8 March 1947 that Australian diplomats were first informed about the 
intentions of the United Kingdom regarding the Palestine Question, and immediately, 
the British were given an early taste of a tentative but clear independent line on 
Palestine from Evatt.
118
 It will be seen that the giving up of the Palestine Question to 
international jurisdiction was regarded by the British as an expedient tactic to rid 
themselves of what was proving to be an intractable conflict. By contrast, I argue that 
the Australian position was based on the need to maintain the legitimacy of the UN 
and an advocacy of the role of smaller powers in international relations.  
 
Firstly, it is interesting to note that External Affairs suggested that not only the 
question of Palestine, but also the financial status of the UN should be placed on the 
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UN agenda.
119
 This was quickly opposed by the British who argued ―we do not think 
it necessary‖ and expressed eagerness to arrive at the quickest possible solution to the 
Palestine Question by confining the agenda to the single issue of Palestine.
120
 The 
Australian reply noted the need for efficacy yet expressed concern ―at the repeated 
references by the Secretary-General to the financial position of the organisation, 
implying that the budget cuts…were seriously prejudicing the efficiency of the 
organisation.‖121 The British argued that for the Assembly to receive a report on the 
financing of the UN or even to only discuss it informally would ―extend [the] duration 
of session beyond what we consider desirable.‖122 On the one hand, the British may 
have truly believed that the UN budget was ―reasonable and should enable [the] 
organisation to deal satisfactorily with its present problems.‖123 On the other hand, 
however, the continual references to the need for expediency with regards to the 
Palestine Question suggest that the British viewed the UN as a tool with which they 
could divest themselves of responsibility for the determination of the future 
governance of Palestine.
124
 By contrast, the Australian insistence on discussing the 
financial status of the UN reflected a concern of Australian foreign policy makers 
with the reputation of the organisation and its ability to handle international issues.  
 
Further, Evatt objected to the British proposal to create an Ad Hoc Committee, and 
cabled Christopher Addison, the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 
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stating that ―we consider it to be bad tactics.‖125 Arguing that the status of such a 
committee could be challenged by the General Assembly, he wrote that the British 
proposition was outside the scope of the powers conferred on the Secretary-General, 
which were ―clearly set out in Chapter XV of the [UN] Charter.‖126 Evatt‘s concern 
was with maintaining the legitimacy of the UN and abiding by its founding charter on 
which the Australian delegation to UNCIO had expended much energy. His criticism, 
however, was somewhat mitigated by the qualification he proffered in the opening of 
his cable to Addison in which he argued that the British proposition would ―be a great 
blow to British prestige.‖127 Whilst Evatt‘s objection to the Secretary-General simply 
appointing an Ad Hoc Committee was quite tentative and was framed as an attempt to 
salvage the esteem of the British, clearly the legitimacy of the UN was a key concern 
of Evatt‘s.  
 
The United States maintained a view similar to that espoused by Evatt. They too were 
―doubtful of the legal validity of the proposal‖ for the Secretary-General to simply 
appoint an Ad Hoc Committee.
128
 Instead, the US recommended that an investigative 
committee be established at a special session of the General Assembly.
129
 In response, 
External Affairs noted ―with interest [the] United States‘ agreement with our view 
that an Ad Hoc Committee may not be regarded as satisfactory‖ and expressed 
support for the calling of a special session in order to create a fact-finding body.
130
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The similar views on the need to maintain the legitimacy of the UN by following 
correct procedure thus evoked early signs of agreement with the US on the Palestine 
Question. 
 
Whilst the Australian opposition to the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee was 
justified by legal technicalities which were indeed later conceded by the British, 
objection to the proposed composition of an investigative committee was framed far 
less judiciously. Britain favoured the inclusion of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council in the proposed Committee, the justification for which was confined 
to one line: ―it seems obvious that permanent members of the Security Council should 
be represented and they will probably expect this.‖131 Clearly, Britain adhered to the 
traditional nature of power politics dominated by the Great Powers.
132
 By contrast, 
Evatt replied: ―we believe…the Assembly itself should appoint a fact-finding 
committee.‖133 As had been on display at UNCIO, a key tenet of Australian foreign 
policy was the refusal to allow postwar international diplomacy to be dominated by 
the Great Powers. Addison, however, avoided the substantive issue of composition 
and simply stated in his response: ―we consider it essential that preparatory work 
should be done before the Assembly meets in September.‖134 Similarly, Evatt did not 
reintroduce the point of conflict.
135
 The lack of Australian insistence on the 
composition of the investigative committee indicates that despite the differences 
between the Australian and British conceptions of postwar diplomacy, Australian 
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diplomats were, as yet, unwilling to stress the issue. This would later change when the 
issue was discussed in the UN. 
 
CREATION OF UNSCOP 
On 28 April 1947, the special session of the General Assembly on Palestine that had 
been recommended by the US opened in New York.
136
 Once the issue of Palestine 
was in the forum of the United Nations, Australian diplomats became more willing to 
pursue an independent line in opposition to that of the UK. I argue that the UN was 
regarded by Australian diplomats as a forum in which the Australian voice could be 
influential as it was an arena in which foreign policy relationships could be cultivated 
to strengthen the Australian position. 
  
The immediate issue at hand was the composition of the investigative committee. 
Australia motioned for a special committee consisting of eleven members with the 
exclusion of the permanent members of the Security Council.
137
 The opposition to the 
inclusion of the Great Powers was explained by the Australian representative to the 
special session, Colonel William Hodgson, who cited instances ―where progress had 
been hampered rather than assisted by an attempt to secure prior agreement among the 
big powers.‖138 The Australian view espoused by Hodgson reflected quite a different 
understanding of international relations from the UK. Whilst the UK had previously 
claimed that it ―seems obvious‖ to include the Big Five in deliberations on Palestine, 
Evatt firmly held the belief that the Great Powers were inevitably preoccupied by 
―questions of prestige and spheres of influence,‖ and that smaller powers were, 
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therefore, crucial in leading the way out of impasses caused by Great Power 
disagreement.
139
 Yet, it will be remembered that although Evatt had voiced opposition 
to the British scheme prior to the UN special session, he had not insisted on the point. 
The fact that this position was now persistently maintained by Hodgson under the 
auspices of the UN indicates that the intention of Australian diplomats was to support 
the UN in order to foster a forum in which the Australian voice could be heard. 
 
Further, the UN was also viewed as a domain in which diplomatic relations could be 
cultivated to add strength to the Australian position. The Australian motion to exclude 
the Great Powers from the investigative committee, for example, was raised in the 
knowledge that the United States would firmly support it. As early as 14 April, 
External Affairs had learned that the US already favoured a committee comprising 
only the ‗neutral‘ states.140 Despite this, the Australian delegation continued to seek 
confirmation of US accordance. On 7 May, Hodgson reported back to External 
Affairs that the delegates of the United States had once again ―assured us privately 
that they would agree to a neutral committee of eleven.‖141 The pursuit of US support 
for the proposal to exclude the Great Powers suggests that Australian policy makers 
regarded the world body as an arena in which foreign policy relationships could be 
promoted in order to further the Australian viewpoint. 
  
The Australian delegation not only attempted to create a fact-finding committee 
comprised of ‗neutral‘ powers that excluded the Big Five, but also attempted to gain 
representation on the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), as 
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it was to be named.
142
 Historians have viewed this campaign to gain representation as 
a prism through which to analyse the underlying assumptions of Australian foreign 
policy with regard to Zionism. For instance, Mandel‘s comprehensive study of Evatt‘s 
role in the creation of Israel asks ―Australia was vigorously campaigning for 
representation on UNSCOP; but with what end in mind?‖143 Mandel answers his own 
question by arguing that Evatt harboured pro-Zionist principles and that he 
―presciently appreciated that UN procedure might offer opportunities to Zionism 
when the time arrived.‖144 This view clearly suggests that for a small power like 
Australia to campaign vigorously for inclusion into UNSCOP, pre-existing opinions 
on the substantive issues must have existed. However, it is difficult to prove, as 
Mandel tries to do, that Australia‘s campaign for inclusion was more about Evatt‘s 
private principles on Zionism rather than his extremely publicised support for the 
participation of smaller powers in international affairs through the UN. I argue that 
the Australian position was based more on the Australian understanding of the new 
world order than on vested interests in Zionism. 
  
There is evidence to support the view that Australian campaign to gain representation 
on UNSCOP was also predicated upon a desire to maintain a voice in international 
affairs. A ministerial memorandum, for example, dated 22 April 1947, declared that 
the ―main purpose of Australian participation in session is to secure for this country a 
place on the body to report to the regular session.‖145 Whilst such a statement does not 
conclusively preclude the possibility of Evatt having been motivated by a pro-Zionist 
attitude, it was quite in keeping with the Australian championing of smaller power 
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nations that occurred at San Francisco in 1945 and was in line with the perspective of 
other smaller powers at this time. Further, in a cable to Hodgson, Evatt stated 
―Australia should not stand for committee unless reasonably sure of election.‖146 This 
does not quite fit Mandel‘s image of a firmly pro-Zionist Evatt who desired 
participation on UNSCOP to further the Zionist cause. Rather, this suggests that Evatt 
wished to avoid the embarrassment of Australia not being elected, and is in alignment 
with the general view that Evatt aspired for greater Australian involvement in 
international affairs.
147
 This raises the question: once Australian diplomats carved for 
themselves a position from which they could influence international affairs, what 
principles would guide their formulation of a Palestine policy? 
 
UNSCOP IN ACTION  
The Australian proposal in the special session was successful, and on 15 May 1947, 
UNSCOP was established, comprising eleven members that specifically excluded the 
Big Five and included Australia.
148
 The Australian representatives on the Committee 
were John Hood and his alternate, Sam Atyeo.
149
 Hood‘s participation in UNSCOP 
reveals that Evatt and other Australian foreign policy makers were keen to propagate 
their conception of a new world order which saw the preservation of the UN as being 
of utmost importance.
150
 As I have suggested, this view was regarded as compatible 
with a pragmatic consideration of Australian interests. 
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One of the first divisions to engulf the Committee did not involve discussion on the 
future of Palestine at all. Rather, it concerned the scheduled British execution of three 
Jewish terrorists, on which UNSCOP had been formally requested by the parents of 
the condemned men to intervene.
151
 Following protracted debate, UNSCOP 
eventually decided to convey the concern of some of its members to the UN 
Secretary-General.
152
 Hood, however, specifically requested that the minutes show he 
disapproved of this course of action.
153
 Hood‘s opposition to intervening in the affair 
has been scantly treated by historians. Most fail to mention the incident at all though it 
attracted heated debate in the early proceedings of UNSCOP.
154
 Mandel recounts it 
only to illustrate that UNSCOP began in a ―baptism of fire‖ and he fails to probe the 
reasons behind Hood‘s adamant position.155 By contrast, Howard Adelman writes of 
Hood‘s stance, ―[he] believed this was a gross deviation from the terms of reference 
of the committee and an interference with those charged with the administration of the 
Mandate.‖156 Adelman subsequently concludes that Hood‘s was a ―pro-British 
stance.‖157 Such historians have not made enough of the engagement of Australian 
foreign policy makers of the period with the overlap between internationalism and 
domestic interest. Instead, I would argue that Hood‘s actions also reflected a concern 
to uphold the legitimacy of the UN as well as a concern not to impinge on the 
domestic jurisdictions of nations that had preoccupied the Australian delegation to 
UNCIO. 
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Adelman‘s reductive conclusion that Hood was simply upholding a pro-British 
position in fact neglects what he identifies as one half of Hood‘s explanation: that 
intervention in the scheduled execution of the condemned terrorists was ―a gross 
deviation from the terms of reference of the committee.‖ In a cable to External 
Affairs, for example, Hood wrote: ―our concern in this question has been with 
prestige and the credit of the Committee.‖158 Hood‘s apprehension was a continuation 
of Australian policy from the beginning of the international consideration of the 
Palestine Question. Evatt, for example, had persistently called for the discussion of 
the financing of the UN, fearful that the efficiency of the world body was in question. 
He had also opposed the British recommendation for an Ad Hoc Committee on the 
grounds that it could derive no legitimacy from the UN Charter. Thus, Hood‘s 
objection to intervention on behalf of the condemned terrorists was reflective of the 
consistent Australian attempt to maintain the legitimacy of the UN and cannot only be 
attributed to a pro-British outlook. 
 
The memoirs of the Guatemalan representative to UNSCOP, Jorge Garcia-Granados, 
paint a rather different picture of Australian policy that is in agreement with the 
conclusions of Adelman. Granados concludes that the Australian position was a pro-
British one, arguing that Hood was ―concerned lest we step on Britain‘s toes.‖159 
Indeed, Granados‘ contention certainly echoes in the official documents. In an 
External Affairs report written by Hood in August, after the conclusion of the special 
session, Hood complained, ―some members (Yugoslavia, Uruguay and Guatemala) 
seem to regard the Committee as a kind of super Royal Commission charged with 
investigating and passing judgement…[on] the manner in which the Mandate has 
                                                 
158 UNSCOP 3, Hood to DEA, 30 June, 1947, A1838 852/19/1/1. 
159 Jorge Garcia-Granados, The Birth of Israel: The Drama As I Saw It (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc, 1948), p. 235. 
 44 
 
been administered over the past twenty-five years.‖160 The frustration expressed was 
grounded not only upon procedural concerns about the proper jurisdiction of 
UNSCOP, but also on a defence of the British. For example, the report continued that 
the Australian position should be to ―support the United Kingdom in 
general…provided there is no conflict with our fundamental views.‖161 Clearly, 
maintaining good relations with Australia‘s traditional ally was still regarded as 
favourable and Australian policy makers sought to do so within the broader context of 
the UN. 
 
Further, Hood‘s reservations on interfering in the executions of the condemned 
terrorists were also aligned with the concerns of the Australian delegation at San 
Francisco regarding the issue of domestic jurisdiction. It will be recalled that in order 
to protect Australia‘s controversial immigration policy, Evatt himself had played a 
pivotal role in an amendment to the draft UN Charter that limited the right of the 
Security Council to interfere in the domestic affairs of member states. Granados 
himself recounts that Hood‘s specific criticism of intercession on behalf of the 
condemned terrorists was that the intervention in an internal administration of a 
country was unacceptable.
162
 Whilst Granados interprets this criticism only as an 
expression of pro-British sentiment, viewed in the context of Australia‘s participation 
at UNCIO, Hood‘s actions were clearly also an attempt to maintaining the domestic 
jurisdiction of states in the context of a burgeoning international sphere. Evidently 
Australian policy makers had  a specific vision of the relevance of the new 
international order to Australia―the UN was to be supported insofar as it offered a 
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stage from which Australian views could be espoused, and within its international 
framework, the protection of specific Australian interests would be fought for. The 
issue of domestic jurisdiction would again surface as UNSCOP reached its final 
deliberations. 
 
As the deliberations of UNSCOP drew to an end, delegates began to vocalise their 
opinions on the political future of Palestine, with two possibilities garnering support: 
the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, or the establishment of a 
federal Palestinian state with safeguards for the Jewish minority.
163
 In early August, 
Hood informed External Affairs of his view that there were serious practical 
difficulties with partition.
164
 The response from Evatt was immediate. He instructed 
Burton: ―tell Hood at once that he should not at this stage take any line against [the] 
partition of Palestine…[he] is there solely to report on events…they must be reminded 
that they are a fact finding body.‖165 Subsequently, in keeping with Evatt‘s 
instructions, Hood began to indicate that the Australian stance would be quite unique 
within UNSCOP. Whilst other members slowly began to announce support either for 
partition or for a unitary state, Hood refused to commit Australia to either proposal. 
At the final meeting of UNSCOP on 31 August, Hood abstained from the vote for 
either of the aforementioned schemes.
166
 Like the issue of the condemned Jewish 
terrorists, the discussion on the final UNSCOP report was another key moment in 
which the balancing of domestic Australian interests within the international 
framework was at stake for Australian foreign policy personnel.   
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The reason for the Australian abstention and the neutrality enforced upon Hood has 
been subject to much debate. Adelman concludes that Hood‘s abstention in the final 
vote reflected Evatt‘s anti-Zionism, and it is this action that forms the crux of his 
contention that Australia was the ‗abortionist‘ of the State of Israel. By contrast, 
Mandel posits that Evatt was pro-Zionist but sought neutrality on UNSCOP as a 
tactical ploy to appease the Arabs in order to secure for himself votes for the 
presidency of the 1947 General Assembly.
167
 Both scholars, therefore, conclude that 
Hood‘s abstention was enforced by Evatt who was motivated by his personal views 
on Zionism. A focus on the new internationalist context, however, reveals other 
explanations that carried, at least, equal weight. 
 
Historians have neglected the official Australian justification for abstention in favour 
of finding Evatt‘s personal motives in forcing Hood to abstain. Hood justified his own 
abstention by arguing that the final determination of Palestine‘s political future could 
only be made by the General Assembly, ―which alone was the competent body to 
decide what was workable and what was not workable.‖168 Hood argued that the 
report should present to the assembly ―the whole range of arguments‖ which, 
therefore, did not require Australia to commit to either one of the proposals presented 
by the Committee.
169
 Although Hood had expressed a personal desire to vote against 
partition, his final abstention was in line with official Australian policy. As early as 6 
June 1947, Evatt, in a statement on Foreign Affairs, had claimed: ―the Australian 
policy in such matters has always been to pursue the principle of full preliminary 
investigation of the facts. It is the only means likely to lead the United Nations to 
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impartial and objective decisions.‖170 Evatt himself wrote that ―the practice of enquiry 
and investigation had become fairly well settled,‖ citing Security Council disputes in 
relation to Iran and Greece on which the Australian delegate had not made 
recommendations until there was full preliminary investigation of the facts.
171
 In other 
words, Hood‘s final abstention reflected a consistent practice of Australian postwar 
foreign policy makers, who consistently insisted upon the need for full investigation 
and due process in the UN to resolve international disputes. 
 
Further, the issue of Jewish refugees in the final report also prompted much 
Australian concern. On 28 August, Hood informed External Affairs that the 
Committee intended to include a provision for ―increased but controlled Jewish 
immigration in [the] transitional period [after the withdrawal of the Mandatory].‖172 
This issue elicited an immediate reply from External Affairs that stated: ―it would not 
be desirable to be committed at this stage to the principle of increased immigration. 
Rather than give the impression that we are committed in the opposite direction…you 
should refrain from adopting any final attitude.‖173 The reasons for such unequivocal 
instructions were elucidated in an External Affairs report drafted in August, which is 
worth quoting at length:  
 
―a solution which would attempt to force the inhabitants, against the will of 
the majority, to accept any alteration in the constitution of its population 
should be opposed. In fact from Australia‘s point of view there would be a 
narrow line between the United Nations attempting to impose upon the 
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Palestinian Arabs an obligation to admit further Jewish immigrants and the 
United Nations attempting to open the doors of Australia to Asiatic 
immigration on the pretext that failure to do so might endanger the peace.‖174 
 
The implication of increased Jewish immigration for Australia‘s own immigration 
policy was crucial in the formation of a Palestine policy by the Department of 
External Affairs.
175
 Again it can be seen that Hood was instructed to protect key 
Australian interests within the framework of the United Nations. 
 
Adelman cites such evidence to argue that consideration of the White Australia Policy 
resulted in an anti-Zionist stance that induced Hood to abstain on UNSCOP‘s final 
vote, rather than support partition.
176
 Mandel, however, counters that partition would 
have obviated concerns about impinging on domestic jurisdiction as Jewish 
immigration would affect a Jewish state, with a Jewish majority ―rather than… an 
undivided Palestine with an Arab majority.‖177 Neither scholar, however, addresses 
the context in which immigration was mentioned in the correspondence between 
Hood and External Affairs during the investigations of UNSCOP. Hood had informed 
External Affairs that the provision for increased Jewish immigration was to be 
included in a ―chapter setting out certain matters on which common ground agreement 
has been found in the committee.‖178 That is, it would not have been included in either 
of the recommendations for partition or for a unitary state, but rather as a generic 
principle agreed upon by UNSCOP. By this reasoning, were partition not accepted, a 
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provision for increased Jewish immigration would have challenged the domestic 
jurisdiction of a federated Palestinian state with an Arab majority. Evidently, 
Australian policy makers were opposed to any aspects of the UNSCOP report insofar 
as they challenged the domestic jurisdiction of a majority population. This was a 
stance taken with Australia‘s own immigration policy in mind.  
 
On 31 August 1947, the members of UNSCOP signed the report that they had 
produced over the course of two and a half months.
179
 The report contained two 
competing proposals for the future Government of Palestine.
180
 The first, agreed to by 
a majority of seven members, recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish 
and an Arab state and the placement of Jerusalem under the authority of the UN.
181
 
The second, agreed to by a minority of three members, recommended the creation of 
an independent federal state of Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital.
182
 The 
Australian vote, cast by John Hood, was the only abstention. Approximately two 
weeks later, the UNSCOP report would be one of the major agenda items of the 
General Assembly at Lake Success. 
 
AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION 
The regular Session of the General Assembly began on 16 September 1947 and the 
international reluctance to come to a decision on Palestine was immediately evident 
as, on 23 September, the Palestine Question was submitted to an Ad Hoc Committee 
for further consideration.
183
 The Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, 
comprising all member states, was charged with examining the UNSCOP report in 
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order to propose final recommendations for the General Assembly.
184
 The pertinent 
Australian involvement in the affair was to continue with the election of Evatt as 
chairman of the committee on 25 September.
185
 As has been suggested before, the 
consistent Australian effort to uphold the legitimacy of the UN was itself pragmatic. 
In what follows I will demonstrate that Evatt‘s actions as chairman epitomised the 
fact that involvement the UN allowed Australian policy makers to influence 
proceedings to protect key Australian interests.  
 
Evatt‘s election as chairman has been offhandedly treated by most scholars. Mandel, 
for instance, describes Evatt as having agreed ―to stand for what was in effect a 
consolation prize‖ after he lost his campaign for the presidency of the General 
Assembly.
186
 Aside from this comment, Mandel attributes Evatt‘s standing for the 
role to the personal characteristics of the Minister who he claims ―was not one to turn 
down a challenge.‖187 Evatt‘s decision to stand for election as chairman of the Ad Hoc 
Committee, however, can offer insights into the nature of the Australian foreign 
policy that he spearheaded as Minster for External Affairs. In his own account of 
events, Evatt recounts being informed by Oswaldo Aranha, the newly elected 
President of the General Assembly, that ―the future of the Assembly depends on the 
success of the Palestine [Ad Hoc] Committee.‖188 Although we might disregard 
Evatt‘s flattering depiction of his decision to stand for chairman as a challenge he 
undertook in order to protect the reputation of the UN itself, in more objective 
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hindsight, his decision to stand was, indeed, a significant one. Evatt‘s acceptance of 
the role not only reflected his concern for a viable and reputable UN. As I will show, 
his decision to become chairman was one that allowed him to successfully manipulate 
proceedings to protect Australian interests. 
 
The Ad Hoc Committee began its work on 27 September 1947.
189
 Throughout the 
course of the general debate, the views of the Great Powers slowly became apparent. 
On 11 October, the United States representative, Herschel V. Johnson announced that 
the US would support the majority plan for the partition of Palestine with a few 
modifications to the UNSCOP recommendation.
190
 Two days later, Semyon K. 
Tsarapkin of the Soviet Union also announced in principle support for the partition of 
Palestine.
191
 Despite these developments, when the US and Sweden jointly proposed 
that the committee proceed on the basis of partition, Evatt ―strongly opposed it from 
the chair,‖ although he himself acknowledged there was a ―complete absence of any 
support for the minority proposal of UNSCOP.‖192 Instead, he requested that the 
committee proceed by appointing three sub-committees: Sub-Committee One to hash 
out details of the majority partition plan, Sub-Committee Two to propose an 
analogous plan based on the Arab proposals for a unitary Arab state in Palestine, and 
Sub-Committee Three to conciliate between the Arabs and Jews.
193
  
 
Evatt‘s decision to proceed in this manner, rather than to take what Mandel refers to 
as the ―easiest, predictable course‖ by proceeding along the lines of partition, has 
attracted significant scholarly attention. Mandel again postulates that Evatt was 
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attempting to curry the support of the Arab states in his bid for the 1948 Assembly 
presidency.
194
 This idea remains feasible inasmuch as Evatt‘s proposing of sub-
committees appeared to temporarily keep the Arab proposals alive. It carries less 
weight, however, if we consider that the vote for the 1948 presidency would only 
occur the following year, by which time the Australian support for partition was clear. 
Mandel further argues that Evatt ―never provided…a convincing explanation for his 
conduct.‖195 Of course, Mandel believes this to be the case given his thesis that Evatt 
had always harboured a pro-Zionist stance and had, therefore, adamantly favoured 
partition from the beginning. However, Evatt himself provides an explanation for his 
decision that is quite consistent again with the participation of Australian diplomats in 
the Palestine Question up until that point. Evatt argued that the committee had a duty 
to consider in detail the various alternatives to partition so that the final proposal 
recommended to the General Assembly was one which had been arrived at after 
careful deliberation.
196
 He continued, ―if we now committed ourselves to the majority 
report…there would be no opportunity for consideration in detail of the various 
alternatives.‖197 Again, the legal Evatt reigned supreme; due process was his concern, 
and as chairman, he was able to ensure this occurred.  
 
It must be noted that Evatt‘s own recount of events does not entirely truthfully portray 
his opposition to the proposal put forward by the US and Sweden to proceed on the 
basis of the partition plan. Evatt revealed to Burton on 26 October that it was the US 
that had proposed ―to refer [the] detailed consideration of majority plan to sub-
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Committee[s].‖198 Evatt, however, presented the suggestion as his own, allowing the 
US to appear to have attempted to make partition the basis of discussions, thus 
appeasing its significant Jewish lobby.
199
 It is this fact that leads Mandel to contend 
that Evatt was not only attempting to curry favour with the Arab states, but also with 
the US, in order to strengthen his future bid for the 1948 presidency.
200
 An 
examination of the establishment of the sub-committees, however, again reveals 
further explanations that Mandel has not taken into account. 
 
The selection of sub-committees was left for Evatt himself to decide.
201
 Thus, he 
constructed Sub-Committee One with members only in favour of partition, and Sub-
Committee Two with members only in favour of a unitary state. In Evatt‘s own Task 
of Nations, he reveals that he was bombarded by an unnamed delegate who wished to 
change the composition of Sub-Committee One. Later on, in conversation with Joseph 
Linton, the Israeli Minister in Sydney, Evatt would divulge the identity of the 
mentioned delegate: Herschel Johnson of the US.
202
 The US delegate had attempted to 
blunt the drive for partition by requesting the replacement of Guatemala and Uruguay, 
two known pro-partition delegates, with France and Brazil, whose delegates had 
―expressly declared that they did not desire to serve on either Committee.‖203 Evatt 
adamantly refused the request and threatened to ―announce from the rostrum that an 
attempt had been made by the Americans to put improper pressure on the 
President.‖204 Why did Evatt refuse this US request to replace certain members of the 
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Committee whilst secretly granting them their wish to create sub-committees? 
Evidently, he cannot simply be said to have been trying to maintain US favour. 
Rather, consideration must turn to Evatt‘s purported reasons: he established the sub-
committees to maintain the principle of due process as the only way, he believed, to 
uphold the UN‘s reputation. This explains his refusal of the US request to change the 
composition of Sub-Committee One, which was an attempt only to delay the 
deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee.
205
 
 
All these persistent efforts by Australian diplomats to protect the legitimacy of the 
UN and to be involved in international affairs only make sense if we consider the 
perspective that the world body would allow Australia to influence policies in a 
manner that accorded well with Australian interests. In The Task of Nations, Evatt 
recounted that attempts were made by delegates within the Ad Hoc Committee to 
discuss the problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons.
206
 The suggestion was 
even raised by Sub-Committee Two for ―all countries [to] take their fair quota of 
displaced persons.‖207 Evatt, however, ruled that the proposals for the future 
government of Palestine did not require the resolution of the Jewish refugee issue, 
thereby avoiding the issue entirely.
208
 Evatt presents the ruling as judicious by arguing 
that it was ―not strictly relevant to the Palestine question.‖209 Other reasons for Evatt‘s 
position, however, can be found upon consideration of the domestic anti-Jewish 
refugee feeling that arose in Australia following World War Two. 
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It will be recalled that after the Holocaust, the Policy of Rescue which allowed limited 
Jewish immigration to Australia on humanitarian grounds, had incited significant 
domestic opposition.
210
 As has also been noted, Hood had adamantly opposed 
intervention in the execution of Jewish terrorists and had also been explicitly 
instructed not to agree to any provision for increased Jewish immigration into 
Palestine so as to avoid setting a dangerous precedent with which Australian 
immigration policy could be challenged. In this case, however, domestic jurisdiction 
would not have been challenged as the proposal was for countries to agree to a Jewish 
intake.
211
 Rather than protecting the legal basis for the White Australia Policy, Evatt, 
aware of the anti-Jewish refugee feeling in Australia, was in fact implementing the 
racist policy itself. 
 
The question of Jewish refugees was not the only issue Evatt, as chairman, dismissed 
from discussion. As Granados notes, a major question that confronted the Committee 
was whether there would need to be an ―external enforcing authority‖ to implement 
the UN‘s recommendations.212 In fact, Granados had proposed that a group of three to 
five small nations contribute armed contingents until the independence of an Arab and 
a Jewish state in Palestine could be realised.
213
 Prior to the commencement of the Ad 
Hoc Committee, Addison had also unequivocally informed External Affairs that the 
UK would not implement any solution that was not agreed to by both the Arabs and 
the Jews and that, ―it would be necessary to provide some alternative authority to 
implement it.‖214 It was abundantly clear, however, that no solution could be reached 
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that would appease both the Jews and the Arabs.
215
 As proceedings continued, British 
pressure strengthened and on 16 October Addison cabled Chifley directly and stated 
rather bluntly, ―the Assembly should not vote on the nature of the settlement for 
Palestine independently of measures to implement it.‖216 Of course, this is exactly 
what occurred.
217
 Why then, was the issue of enforcement avoided? 
 
Evatt addressed the matter of enforcement in The Task of Nations where he wrote that 
the establishment of enforcement machinery would have ―misconceive[d] the true 
functions of the General Assembly.‖ 218 The General Assembly, he argued, had ―no 
executive authority apart from its power to regulate its internal administrative 
machine.‖ 219 Evatt, however, was not only espousing his own understanding of the 
legal nuances of the UN Charter, but also the wishes of the Chifley Government. As 
early as 1 October, Evatt had been forced to deny an accusation made in the House of 
Representatives that ―British troops would no doubt have to enforce [the] Palestine 
solution.‖220 Although this statement referred to British soldiers, the implication was 
clear: Australian troops too, should not be committed to Palestine. In fact, on 21 
October, this implication was made explicit when Chifley was questioned in the 
House of Representatives as to whether Evatt ―has been informed of the decision of 
the Government that in no circumstances will Australian troops be sent to 
Palestine…[in] an international force?‖221 Chifley responded that Evatt was aware of 
the stance of the Government, and regardless of the truthfulness of Chifley‘s claim, 
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Evatt was certainly made subsequently aware of the Government‘s position as he was 
forwarded the exchange.
222
 Thus, in opposing the discussion of enforcement 
mechanisms from the chair, Evatt was keeping in line with the views of his 
government. He triumphantly reported back to Burton: ―no question arises of any 
contribution by Australia…to military or political or any other force in Palestine.‖223 
Evidently Evatt was aware that he, as chairman, had successfully dodged a bullet that 
would have challenged a key principle of Australian foreign policy.  
 
On 25 November, the resolution of Sub-Committee One was amended and approved 
by the Ad Hoc Committee.
224
 The resolution endorsed the partition of Palestine into 
an Arab and a Jewish state with the placement of Jerusalem under a special 
international regime.
225
 Authorised by the Chifley Government to support the 
partition plan, Evatt cast the Australian vote in favour of partition from the chair.
226
 In 
the Ad Hoc Committee, however, partition commanded one vote short of a two-thirds 
majority that would be required in the General Assembly.
227
 Evatt subsequently urged 
Aranha to influence the Latin Americas to support the partition plan, arguing that ―the 
choice…is now between a complete washout and a positive solution.‖228 From the 
Australian perspective, the rejection of partition would have been less a disaster for 
the Jewish people seeking a national home in Palestine, and more a disaster for the 
authority of the UN.
229
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On 29 November 1947, history was made as a two-thirds majority of the Plenary 
Session of the General Assembly voted in accordance with the recommendations of 
the Ad Hoc Committee.
230
 Thus, the plan for partition was officially endorsed by the 
United Nations.  
 
It will be remembered that an External Affairs report written in August had declared 
that the United Kingdom should be supported in general, ―provided there is no 
conflict with our fundamental views.‖231 The various conflicts between the Australian 
and the UK position by this stage of the Palestine Question clearly illustrates that the 
Australian understanding of postwar diplomacy did indeed fundamentally conflict 
with that of the British. The Australian conception of the new world order placed the 
United Nations at the fore of diplomacy and international relations. The world body 
was regarded as the domain in which the Australian voice would best be heard and 
therefore the maintenance of its authority became a distinct Australian interest. Other 
domestic considerations were to be advocated within the framework of the UN and by 
being active in the organisation, Australia could influence matters in a manner that 
accorded well with Australian interests. By contrast, the world body was regarded as 
only as an expedient by the British rather than as the future for postwar diplomacy. 
This fundamental difference led Australian diplomats to tentatively challenge the UK 
position on more than one occasion, resulting in a growing understanding with the 
US.  
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Chapter III 
The Aftermath of Partition:  
The Emboldened Australian Stance 
 
The 29 November decision [in shorthand] indicated that the United Nations was 
willing to make difficult decisions on particularly intractable conflicts, but it far from 
guaranteed the future of Palestine. It will be seen that even as Australia remained 
firmly pro-partition, support for the implementation of partition was less than 
forthcoming from Britain and America, as each in fact attempted to prevent its 
realisation upon reconsideration of their strategic interests. This chapter will trace the 
Australian involvement in the Palestine Question following the passage of the 
partition decision in the General Assembly. I will explore the ideological and 
pragmatic reasons for the distinctive Australian stance in the absence of support from 
both of Australia‘s Great Power allies, focusing in particular on its significance for 
Australian–British relations. 
 
PALESTINE COMMISSION 
Prior to the adjournment of the General Assembly on 29 November, the Palestine 
Commission, consisting of Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and the 
Phillipines, was established and charged with the responsibility of implementing 
partition.
232
 In order to prepare for the withdrawal of the Mandatory and the 
establishment of provisional Arab and Jewish governments, it had been intended that 
the Commission leave for Palestine immediately after the UN decision of 29 
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November.
233
 The UK, however, was at odds with this intention. Rather than allowing 
the Palestine Commission to enter Palestine to undertake preparatory work, in 
December 1947, the UK proclaimed that they would ―do all in our power to secure 
that [the] Commission does not arrive in Palestine before we are ready to hand 
over.‖234 In their view, Arab governments would not ―make trouble while we are still 
in charge‖ and thus ―it would be intolerable if [the] Palestine Government had to 
share authority with [the] UN Commission.‖235 Essentially, the UK refused to allow 
the Palestine Commission entrance into Palestine in order to lay the foundations for 
partition. The UK position caused much tension between Australian and British 
diplomats and revealed that the Australians, following the stance of Evatt, were 
willing to attack the UK position in order to uphold the findings of the UN. 
 
Australian diplomats expressed a scathing response to the UK refusal to allow the 
Palestine Commission to undertake preparatory work within Palestine following the 
29 November decision.
236
 Evatt highlighted the fact that the partition plan had already 
been amended to accommodate the surprise UK announcement on 20 September 1947 
of an early withdrawal from Palestine, and he argued that if the British were to deny 
the Palestine Commission entrance to Palestine, ―an almost inevitable result of this 
would be to bring into contempt the authority of the United Nations and its 
Commission.‖237 His words were intentionally critical and he was well aware of their 
potential repercussions; as per Evatt‘s wishes, Burton instructed Hood to ―observe and 
report in full on [the] dangerous situation likely to arise‖ following the sending of 
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Evatt‘s cable.238 Similarly, at a meeting of High Commissioners in London, 
Australia‘s Jack Beasley challenged Hector McNeil, the Minister of State in the 
Foreign Office, when McNeil proclaimed that Britain would not contribute to any 
international force in Palestine even if the Palestine Commission was to be permitted 
entry.
239
 Beasley argued that a refusal to contribute to such a force would constitute a 
veto of the UN decision for partition.
240
 It will be remembered that in the early stages 
of the international discussion of the Palestine Question, opposition to British policies 
had been tentative and were tempered by claims that the Australian position was 
predicated on upholding British ‗prestige.‘ The assertiveness on display following the 
29 November resolution was unusual for the Australians, and there had been no 
evidence of it prior to the decision of the General Assembly, despite Australian 
support for partition during the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee. Now that 
partition had been endorsed by the UN, Australian diplomats became more assertive 
in their criticisms of the UK in order to uphold the findings of the world body.  
 
By contrast, Britain was happy to ignore the UN decision, and on 30 January, without 
consultation of the Palestine Commission, the British announced that the Mandate 
would terminate on 15 May 1948.
241
 The only template for the future governance of 
Palestine the UK had in mind was the Palestine Commission, a body they themselves 
had not allowed to undertake preparatory work.
242
 As Richard Jasse argues, for the 
British, the UN was to be supported only to the extent that it concurred with their 
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position.
243
 It was this fundamental difference in views that explains the Australian 
dissent from the British stance in the Palestine Question.  
 
TRUSTEESHIP 
As the deadline for the British withdrawal from Palestine drew closer, another more 
serious attempt to derail partition came in the form of the United States‘ proposal to 
place Palestine under a trusteeship, which was inspired by the emergent Cold War.
244
 
Trusteeship, that is, the administration of a dependent area by a state responsible to an 
international organisation for that administration, was a key function of the UN.
245
 
Australia had even been a signatory on a proposal for the UN Charter to refer to 
trusteeship, which had been absent from the original Dumbarton Oaks draft.
246
 The 
goal of the international trusteeship system, as developed at San Francisco and 
enshrined in the UN Charter, was the attainment of self-government or 
independence.
247
 In the case of Palestine, however, it was clear that both the Jews and 
Arabs had the proficiency for self-government.
248
 Thus, whilst UNSCOP had 
produced two reports recommending either partition or the creation of a unitary 
federal state, the committee had been unanimous in calling for the end of the British 
mandate and the creation of procedures leading to the independence of Palestine.
249
 
As I will show, the issue of trusteeship illuminated the differences in the view of 
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postwar diplomacy held by Australian diplomats and their American and British 
counterparts. I argue that due to the 29 November resolution, Australian policy 
makers were emboldened to defend the UN decision against of the vacillation of the 
Great Powers. 
 
On 19 March 1948, the United States representative to the Security Council, Warren 
Austin, called for the suspension of action on partition in favour of a temporary UN 
trusteeship in Palestine.
250
 The proposal was also enthusiastically adopted by the 
UK.
251
 Thomas W. Lippman, specialist on Middle Eastern Affairs and US foreign 
policy, explains that the onset of the Cold War meant that the US was increasingly 
unwilling to allow the Soviet Union a foothold in the Middle East.
252
 Mandel concurs 
as he writes, ―[the US] believed that trusteeship with Soviet disapproval was better 
than having 10,000 Red Army troops on the ground to enforce partition.‖253 Indeed, as 
early as December 1947, External Affairs had been informed by the British that ―the 
United States would greatly dislike the idea of a Soviet force in Palestine.‖254 
Similarly, Philip Noel-Baker, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 
who had replaced Addison, indicated that the British were also suspicious of Soviet 
intentions in Palestine as he warned External Affairs that the ―primary aim of the 
Soviet Government is probably to debar the United Kingdom…from maintaining their 
strategic position…[which] seems to them to lie in encouraging partition.‖255 
Australia‘s Great Power allies were thus already propagating a foreign policy outlook 
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that viewed the world in a dichotomous way; on the one hand there was a Soviet bloc 
and on the other, there was the US and her supporters. For both the US and the UK, 
restraint of the Soviet position was crucial in the context of the emerging Cold War. 
 
The Australian Government, by contrast, maintained that Cold War politics could best 
be resolved through cooperation on the world body rather than through division into 
political blocs.
256
 Thus, the Anglo-American view that the Soviet Union should be 
restrained was rejected by Australian foreign policy makers.
257
 Ralph Harry, the 
Australian First Secretary in New York, for example, informed the Jewish Agency 
that Australia disapproved of the US opposition to the sending of Soviet troops to 
enforce the partition decision in Palestine.
258
 Evatt, in a cable forwarded to the US 
mission to the UN, similarly criticised the US attempt to revert to trusteeship for 
Palestine as a ―tendency in international relations for…policies based on strategic 
considerations and power politics,‖ whilst he emphasised that the Australian policy 
with regard to Palestine was moulded with ―a view to a settlement based upon right 
and justice.‖ 259 Although this was the view Evatt was championing to US diplomats, 
it was a view consistent with that espoused by the Australian Acting Counsellor to the 
UN division of External Affairs, Keith Shann. Shann issued a memorandum on 
Palestine arguing that ―consideration of possible strategic interests either in terms of 
future allies, military bases, or oil, is likely to distort the picture.‖260 His conclusion 
was that ―we should proceed on the assumption that the objective is to arrive at a just 
and workable settlement…stability in Palestine is most likely to ensure the 
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maintenance of peace and security.‖261 The Australian view was that partition was 
indeed a ‗just and workable settlement,‘ as it had been arrived at by the General 
Assembly following a full preliminary investigation of the facts.
262
 This was aligned 
with Evatt‘s struggle at UNCIO to expand the social and economic chapters of the UN 
charter, which, as it will be recalled, was predicated on the belief that the best way to 
achieve peace was to resolve international conflicts on principles of justice. 
 
In defence of the original partition decision, Australian diplomats challenged the 
support of both the US and the UK for trusteeship. In private cables with Noel-Baker, 
Evatt accused Britain of being unsupportive of partition, arguing that this was 
interpreted as ―signs of weakness‖ which encouraged the Arabs to resort to 
violence.
263
 This elicited a heated response from Noel-Baker who refuted Evatt‘s 
accusation, contending that the only signs of weakness were those ―demonstrated in 
[the] resolution itself.‖264 This was a personal attack on Evatt, who had of course 
spearheaded the partition resolution, and a sign of deteriorating Australian–British 
relations. Evatt, however, maintained his position publically, and on 22 March, he 
released a press statement that condemned trusteeship in which he attacked both the 
US and the UK by arguing, ―had the great powers who supported the [partition] 
proposal…adhered firmly to it there probably would have been little difficulty.‖265 
Evatt argued that any decision reached after ―there has been full enquiry and fair 
debate‖ should not be set aside and that ―to throw the solution into the melting pot 
again may be very damaging to the authority of the United Nations.‖266 Evatt‘s strong 
                                                 
261 Ibid. 
262 Evatt, Task of Nations, pp. 131, 168. 
263 DEA to Noel-Baker, 3 April 1948, AA A1838 852/20/2 Part 5. 
264 Ibid.  
265 Full text quoted in Mandel, H.V. Evatt and the Establishment of Israel, pp.171—3.  
266 Ibid. 
 66 
 
stance against both the UK and the US was in stark contrast to that exhibited by 
Australian diplomats when they had continually sought to attain US support for their 
proposition to exclude the Big Five from UNSCOP earlier in the deliberations on the 
Palestine Question. The belief that partition offered a just resolution to the conflict in 
Palestine and the need to uphold the decision in order to maintain the authority of the 
UN thus emboldened Australian diplomats to oppose the views of both of Australia‘s 
Great Power allies. 
 
Despite Evatt‘s publicised opposition to the reconsideration of the Palestine Question, 
on 1 April 1948, the Security Council adopted the US proposal to request a special 
session in order to formally introduce the idea of trusteeship.
267
 On the day the 
Australian delegation to the UN was informed that the special session would be held, 
Hood cabled External Affairs and warned: ―it is clear the United States will make a 
strenuous effort to line up support and will take advantage of Bogota Conference to 
line up Latin Americans.‖ 268 Hood was referring to a conference between the US and 
the Latin American states regarding the establishment of a multilateral security 
pact.
269
 Hood‘s concern was pre-empted by Evatt, who had already cabled the 
Australian representatives in Chile and Brazil, requesting that the foreign ministers of 
both nations should have personal copies of Evatt‘s 22 March press release.270 
Clearly, it was believed by Australian policy makers that diplomatic brokerage could 
be gained by participating in international fora. Hood, for example, was convinced 
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that ―delegations not committed to support of [the] United States are, we believe, 
looking to Australia for a lead following Minister‘s statement.‖271  
 
Despite what had initially been regarded as a serious setback to the partition plan, the 
US proposal for trusteeship failed to gain significant support. In fact, in light of 
serious objections in the special session, the American proposal was never formally 
placed on the UN agenda.
272
 The only result of the special session was the 
appointment of Count Bernadotte of Sweden as United Nations Mediator, charged 
with the task of attaining a peaceful solution in Palestine.
273
 Thus, the 29 November 
decision to partition Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state remained in force.
274
  
 
THE CREATION OF ISRAEL  
With the failure of the US‘ proposal for trusteeship, partition looked set to occur 
despite the Palestine Commission‘s lack of preparation. When the British withdrew on 
15 May 1948, Arab forces with contingents from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia invaded Palestine, instigating the First Arab-Israeli War.
275
 It was in 
the midst of this war, on 16 May 1948, that David Ben Gurion, head of the Jewish 
Agency, proclaimed the creation of the State of Israel.
276
 The future of the Jewish 
state, however, was still far from certain and the issue of boundaries formed the basis 
for yet another clash between the Australian viewpoint and those of the British and 
the Americans. On this issue, the assertiveness that had been on display during the 
question of trusteeship was continued, and again the Australians took the lead in 
                                                 
271 Ibid. 
272 Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, p. 357. 
273 Reich, Australia and Israel, p. 37. 
274 Evatt, The Task of Nations, p. 170. 
275 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, pp. 200–1. 
276 Mandel, H.V. Evatt and the Establishment of Israel, p. 184. 
 68 
 
challenging the policies of both the UK and the US. I will show that the crux of the 
Australian desire to be involved in the Palestine Question was to gain the status to not 
only be heard but also to be informed on international affairs. It will be seen that 
Australian diplomats came to regard the UN rather than the Australian-British alliance 
as being the best method to achieve this.  
 
Following the proclamation of Israel, the United Nations was concerned with 
procuring a permanent cessation of violence. The UN Mediator, Count Bernadotte, 
put forward proposals in an attempt to design such a peaceful settlement. In his final 
plan before his assassination on 17 September, Bernadotte proposed significant 
territorial adjustments to the initial scheme for partition that favoured the Arabs.
277
 
The British gave ―whole-hearted and unqualified support‖ to his report and informed 
External Affairs that ―the United States Government…reached conclusions regarding 
territorial settlement in Palestine which are very similar to our own.‖278  
 
The UK, with the support of the US, subsequently submitted a resolution on the basis 
of the Bernadotte plan to the 1948 regular session of the UN.
279
  Evatt, however, 
indicated that as was the case on the issue of trusteeship, Australia would be willing to 
challenge her Great Power allies in order to uphold the original findings of the UN 
General Assembly.
280
 Evatt informed Burton: ―the Bernadotte plan as [a] starting 
point is quite out of the question.‖281 In fact, the Australian delegation submitted a 
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conflicting resolution for the establishment of a Boundary and Mediation Commission 
that would decide the boundaries of the future Jewish and Arab states in conformity 
with the original partition resolution.
282
 Clearly, the Australians wished to implement 
the decision of the General Assembly rather than proceed from the recommendations 
of Bernadotte. The UK criticised the Australian proposal on the grounds that the 
Commission would be restricted to a solution based on direct negotiation, to which 
Hood retorted, ―the logic of events, the present position in Palestine and common 
sense all point to the need for a real effort by the United Nations along these lines.‖283 
The Australian position was bolstered by yet another abrupt reversal of policy from 
US policy makers, who withdrew support for the Bernadotte plan.
284
 The UK 
subsequently acquiesced and implemented amendments to their resolution that were 
in alignment with the Australian approach.
285
  
 
The Australian response to these changes in the UK position reveals that a key goal of 
Australian foreign policy makers was not only to be heard but also to be informed of 
developments in international affairs and in British policy. Rather than being pleased 
with the newfound UK acceptance of the Australian approach, Evatt expressed 
frustration at the lack of forewarning from the UK of its ―somersault.‖286 He 
instructed Beasley to voice the opinion that the ―United Kingdom had not only misled 
us as to their intentions…they then today proceeded to concur in virtually our 
approach without previously informing us.‖287 Following this expression of 
frustration, however, policy makers subsequently sought to strengthen communication 
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with Australia‘s traditional ally. For instance, at a High Commissioners Meeting on 
17 December, Beasley voiced the view that Australia desired increased 
Commonwealth consultation.
288
 The Australian concern was raised successfully and 
Beasley ―received general support for a special meeting of High Commissioners in 
[the] new year to consider practical measures for increased consultation.‖289  
 
Throughout the developments of the Palestine Question, however, it became 
increasingly clear that the UN, rather than the UK, offered a more effective forum in 
which Australian policy makers could seek greater international involvement. In 
private correspondence with Burton, Evatt indicated that although the revised UK 
position was in accordance with that of Australia, it was to be voted on in advance of 
the Australian resolution, thereby discomfiting Australia as well as the delegations 
who offered support for the Australian approach.
290
 To prevent such embarrassment, 
Hood called for the committee to prepare a single text instead of various alternative 
resolutions.
291
 When this was rejected, he strained Anglo-Australian relations further 
by proposing all substantial parts of the Australian resolution as amendments to that 
proposed by the UK.
292
 The UK voted against all amendments.
293
 The fact that the 
British manoeuvre, which had the potential to embarrass the Australian position in the 
UN, was regarded by the Australian delegation as sufficient justification for further 
antagonising the UK illustrates the growing importance of the UN forum for policy 
makers, rather than that offered by the British.  
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Confirmation that the UN rather than the UK could allow Australia a greater voice on 
international affairs was found during discussions on the composition of the 
Conciliation Commission, as the proposed Boundary and Mediation Commission was 
to be named. The Australian position, enunciated in a statement by Hood in the First 
Committee of the UN, was that the composition of the Conciliation Commission 
should be determined by the General Assembly, as had been the case with 
UNSCOP.
294
 Alternatively, the Canadians, with the support of the British and the 
Americans, submitted a proposal for a three person Commission to be chosen by the 
permanent members of the Security Council.
295
 Although the Canadian proposal was 
passed, ―support for [the] inclusion of Australia…had been apparent‖ from other 
members of the committee.
296
 In the end, however, the Committee was comprised of 
the United States, France and Turkey.
297
 It was the UK that had insisted on the 
inclusion of Turkey instead of Australia on the premise that ―the wishes of Arab 
states…must be given weight.‖298 Beasley, at the Commonwealth High 
Commissioners meeting, expressed his displeasure at the British manoeuvre.
299
 The 
fact that Australia desired a position on the Commission was verified by Evatt‘s 
instructions to Beasley the following month: ―you should point out…that we would 
have been elected to the Commission on Palestine but for Bevin‘s insistence that 
Turkey should be preferred to Australia.‖300 Throughout the international 
consideration of the Palestine Question, Australian diplomats consistently 
campaigned for representation on subsidiary bodies of the UN, often to the 
displeasure of the British. 
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RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL 
At the same time that the UN was considering the proposals of Bernadotte, Israel was 
attempting to consolidate its international status. On 17 May 1948, External Affairs 
received a request from the Foreign Secretary of the Provisional Government of Israel 
for Australia to grant recognition to the new state.
301
 The subsequent consideration of 
this request reveals that whilst the UN was becoming of greater importance for 
Australian policy makers, in the absence of conflict between the interests of the 
British and the resolutions of the UN, Australian diplomats remained eager to 
maintain favourable relations with their traditional ally. This was more an enthusiasm, 
however, to cultivate bilateral relations with the UK rather than with the British 
Commonwealth in its entirety, predicated upon the belief that the alliance would 
confer diplomatic benefits to Australia. 
 
As I have shown, when the decisions of the UN were at odds with the views of the 
UK, Australian policy makers prioritised their support for the world body on the 
understanding that it offered the best platform from which Australian interests could 
be advocated. When Noel-Baker in May 1948 exerted considerable pressure on the 
Commonwealth states not to recognise Israel, however, the Australian response was 
one of complete support. Noel-Baker argued that recognition should be withheld to 
salvage relations with the Arabs and postulated that ―our policy will of course be 
considerably impaired if any Commonwealth Government grants immediate 
recognition, even de facto, to the Jewish State.‖302 Evatt was exceedingly placatory 
and his response began with the assertion that, ―we fully understand your point of 
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view,‖ adding, ―it is most important that we act together.‖303 It was apparent, 
however, that External Affairs favoured the recognition of Israel. Evatt, for instance, 
attempted to assuage British frustration that Transjordan, a key Middle East ally of the 
UK, had been denied membership of the UN by insinuating to Noel-Baker that 
following the recognition of Israel, Transjordanian membership could be 
forthcoming.
304
 Further, External Affairs had not believed it necessary to ―act 
together‖ with the British when they had favoured trusteeship or when they had 
wished to adopt the Bernadotte proposals. The crucial difference, however, was that 
whilst trusteeship and the adoption of the Bernadotte plans were in opposition to the 
original partition decision of the General Assembly, the recognition of Israel had not 
been explicitly included as a feature of the partition plan. By denying recognition to 
the State of Israel, Australian policy makers were able to appease the British whilst 
not contravening the decisions of the UN. 
 
The Australian position on the recognition of Israel illustrated that some policy 
makers were less concerned with the British Commonwealth than with the bilateral 
alliance with the UK. On 1 June, Evatt presented a submission to Cabinet requesting 
that Israel be recognised, arguing that although the situation in Palestine was still 
tenuous, the Provisional Jewish Government was exercising effective control over the 
area accorded to them by the UN.
 305
 South Africa had already dissented from the 
British position and had accorded de facto recognition to Israel on 24 May.
306
 Further, 
the Australian High Commissioner in Wellington, Roden Cutler, had reported to 
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External Affairs in late May that the New Zealand Government were ―very much 
inclined to recognise the de facto Provisional Government of Israel,‖ though they 
were ―unlikely to make [an] early announcement and may delay until after Australian 
decision is known.‖307 Evidently, the Australian recognition of Israel would have 
accrued substantial Commonwealth support, and could have paved the way for the 
Commonwealth states to unite in favour of recognition and thus pressure the UK into 
following suit. Despite the support of both Chifley and Evatt for the recognition of 
Israel, however, Cabinet decided to approve recognition only if ―agreement [could] be 
reached‖ with Great Britain.308 Cabinet‘s refusal of Evatt‘s request suggests that for 
some Australian foreign policy makers, maintaining favourable relations with the UK 
rather than the British Commonwealth at large was of utmost importance. 
  
As more countries began to recognise the State of Israel, the Australian stance 
towards the UK became increasingly inimical and reflected the fact that the Australian 
support for the British position had been predicated upon the understanding that the 
alliance with the British would confer diplomatic benefits to Australia.
309
 Although 
the UK maintained that recognition should be withheld by Commonwealth members, 
Evatt was spurred into action by the Canadian announcement of de facto recognition 
of the Provisional Government on 26 December 1948.
310
 Evatt cabled Burton on the 
same day, demanding that he announce recognition of the State of Israel ―as soon as 
possible.‖311 This time his request was rejected by Chifley, who argued that ―no 
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decision will be taken until [the] Cabinet meeting late in January.‖312 This was despite 
the fact that Chifley, as it will be recalled, had supported Evatt‘s first approach to 
Cabinet requesting permission to recognise Israel. Although Chifley supported Evatt‘s 
position, he was unwilling to challenge the decision of policy makers within Cabinet, 
who clearly held different views to External Affairs as to the importance of aligning 
with the UK. However, when Evatt was informed by Beasley on 19 January 1949 of 
the imminent British recognition of Israel, his response was no less than hostile. Evatt 
demanded that Beasley find out precisely when the UK Government would accord 
recognition and that Beasley ―insist that United Kingdom does not steal a march on 
Australia in recognition of Palestine.‖313 After having upheld their desire for non-
recognition, Evatt expected Australia to be allowed to recognise Israel before Britain. 
Beasley was also instructed to point out that Australia had been strongly in favour of 
recognition eight months prior but had refrained ―at their persistent and almost 
incessant request.‖314 The indignation expressed reflected the fact that postwar 
Australian diplomacy was focussed on attaining influence; acquiescence to the views 
of the UK hardly meant a return to the imperial fold of the pre-war years. 
 
Finally, on 27 January 1949, the Australian Cabinet approved the recognition of the 
Jewish state, to be announced simultaneously with the UK Government.
315
 Both 
Chifley and Evatt released press statements justifying the Australian decision in 
which they each referred to Australia‘s ―unwavering support [for] the decisions of the 
United Nations.‖316 Evatt went further to argue that ―the legal basis of Israel is 
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unassailable‖ as it ―rests on the decision of the United Nations Assembly of 1947.‖317 
Although Cabinet permitted only simultaneous announcement, Australian policy 
makers not only highlighted their faithfulness to the UN, but also the independence of 
Australian action from that of the British. This was reflected in the act of recognition 
itself. The de jure recognition of Israel accorded by Australia was an irrevocable 
acknowledgement that the state existed according to international law.
318
 By contrast, 
the British offered de facto recognition, which only provisionally acknowledged the 
existence of the state and had the potential to be revoked.
319
 Thus by offering de jure 
recognition, the first of its kind from a Western nation, Australian diplomats were 
stealing the thunder from the British, showing that Australia was an independent 
player on the international stage, guided only by the principles of the UN.  
 
THE ADMISSION OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
Following the proclamation of the State of Israel, Israeli diplomats not only attempted 
to attain recognition from states, but also from the United Nations.
320
 Israel‘s 
application for UN membership was heard by the Security Council on 3 December 
1948.
321
 The Security Council rejected the application, however, due to intense British 
opposition and thus the Israeli case was not heard in the General Assembly.
322
 A 
subsequent application was lodged in late February 1949.
323
 Australia‘s views on the 
admission of Israel to the UN illustrates that tensions with the British on the Palestine 
Question shaped subsequent Australian policy and confirms that the authority of the 
decisions of the UN fuelled the assertiveness of Australian foreign policy makers. 
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Even following the recognition of Israel by both Australia and the UK, the UK 
Government were reluctant to allow Israel admission to the UN.
324
 The Australian 
response to this reflected the disillusionment felt due to the fact that the British had 
prevented Australia‘s inclusion on the Palestine Commission and had almost accorded 
recognition to Israel in advance of Australia. Chifley brusquely stated that Australia 
would favour the admission of Israel and hoped that its application ―will be treated on 
its merits and will be divorced from other considerations.‖325 Chifley was clearly 
critical of the UK position, insinuating that it was based on the strategic desire to 
placate the Arab states. Similarly, Burton instructed the First Secretary in New York, 
Arthur Tange, to take the position that Australia would support the application of 
Israel for membership, ―regardless of bargains.‖326 Although Australian diplomats had 
refrained from recognising Israel for eight months due to British pressure, they were 
not prepared to capitulate once more and deny Israel entry to the UN. On 4 March, the 
Security Council approved a resolution for the General Assembly to favourably 
consider the admission of Israel, a decision on which Britain had abstained.
327
 
Following this, Australian frustration at the prior machinations of the British was 
evident in the fact that it was Hood who, on 6 May, moved a joint resolution to the 
UN General Assembly submitted by Australia, Canada, Guatemala, Haiti, Panama, 
the US and Uruguay, officially recommending admission.
328
 This resolution was 
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adopted by the General Assembly on 11 May, thereby making Israel a member of the 
United Nations.
329
 
 
Further, it will be remembered that the Australian Cabinet, in June 1948, ruled that 
the Australian recognition of Israel was only to occur with the support of the UK 
Government. Cabinet members had been unwilling to fracture relations with the 
British on an issue that British diplomats had expressed clear opposition to. In 
December 1948, however, Cabinet indicated that ―recognition would be reconsidered 
after the admission of Israel to the United Nations.‖330 Of course, Australian 
recognition of Israel was able to precede Israel‘s admission to the UN on account of 
British recognition. However, the fact that international opinion had the potential to 
undermine the adherence of Cabinet members to the British position indicates that the 
assertiveness of Australian policy makers was fuelled by the authority of UN 
decisions. 
 
JERUSALEM 
By the time Israel was admitted to the United Nations, the Jewish state had already 
reached armistice agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Transjordan.
331
 World 
attention then turned to the problematic issue of Jerusalem and its international 
status.
332
 The insistence of Australian diplomats on the issue was greater than had 
been previously shown on the Palestine Question. In fact, Australian diplomats 
maintained a position contrary to all its traditional allies: the UK, the British 
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Commonwealth and the US. In the following section I will demonstrate that this 
assertiveness was also fuelled by pressing domestic political concerns. 
 
The provisions of the 29 November 1947 partition plan for the city of Jerusalem to be 
established as a special international regime under the authority of the United Nations 
had attracted consensus at the 1947 session of the General Assembly.
333
 However, in 
the subsequent Arab-Israeli war, Jerusalem became partitioned between Israel and 
Jordan, as Transjordan renamed itself in April 1949.
334
 As a result, neither Israel nor 
Jordan wished to surrender Jerusalem to international control. In this context, support 
for the full internationalisation of Jerusalem began to unravel in 1949. In August, the 
United Kingdom indicated that although full internationalisation was preferable, the 
―partition of Jerusalem for administration purposes with international supervision, 
particularly of the Holy Places‖ would be accepted.335 This idea of subjecting only the 
Holy Places to international control gained increasing international support and was 
formalised in the draft statute for Jerusalem, produced on 27 September by the 
Palestine Conciliation Commission that had replaced the functions of the UN 
Mediator.
336
 Despite this, on 18 November, the Australian UN delegation put forward 
a draft resolution proposing that all of Jerusalem be internationalised, in concurrence 
with the original UN resolution.
337
 The US was completely opposed to the Australian 
suggestion, arguing that it was impracticable, whilst the UK and other 
Commonwealth members including Canada and New Zealand were ―not 
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enthusiastic.‖338 When the Australian resolution was passed in the Political 
Committee of the UN on 7 December, this was done despite the opposition of both the 
US and the UK, the two Western powers most involved in Palestine.
339
 Further, it was 
passed without Commonwealth support: South Africa opposed the resolution whilst 
New Zealand, Canada and India abstained.
340
  Two days later, the General Assembly 
also voted in favour of the complete internationalisation of Jerusalem.
341
 
 
The Australian championing of full internationalisation without the support of her 
Great Power allies or the British Commonwealth can be attributed to the pressures 
exerted by the domestic Catholic constituency on the Chifley Government. An 
External Affairs statement released after the reaffirmation of the full 
internationalisation of Jerusalem in the UN proclaimed that ―the Australian 
proposal…had received the whole-hearted support of religious leaders.‖342 This 
reference hinted at the pressure felt by Australian diplomats from Catholic 
representatives, who firmly and vocally adhered to the original scheme for the full 
internationalisation of Jerusalem. The Apostolic Delegate, for instance, explicitly 
informed Evatt that ―the Holy See still maintains that only full internationalisation of 
the City of Jerusalem and not a mere international control over the Holy Places can be 
of lasting effect.‖343 Numerous letters were also sent to Evatt from parishes around 
Australia to the same effect.
344
 It was clear that the Australian position was being 
formulated with respect to this pressure, especially in light of the fact that elections 
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were due to take place in Australia late in 1949.
345
 For example, Abba Eban, Israel‘s 
Ambassador to the UN wrote of Evatt, ―it was known that the elections in his country 
would be tightly fought and that the Catholic vote was of some importance.‖346 It was 
such domestic considerations that motivated Australian diplomats to pursue full 
internationalisation although it has been labelled by contemporary historians as 
―abstract and unrealistic,‖ and was, in fact, never implemented.347 
 
In summary, the 29 November UN decision was seen to confer legitimacy to the plan 
for partition and thereby emboldened Australian foreign policy makers to challenge 
the views of both the UK and the US more adamantly than before. This assertiveness 
was fostered by an ideological belief that partition, being a resolution of the General 
Assembly that was arrived at after full preliminary investigation, offered the only just 
solution to the Palestine Question. This was also aligned with the understanding that 
the UN offered the best domain for Australia to be involved in international affairs, 
thereby making the legitimacy of the UN a key Australian interest. Whilst support for 
the UK was not foreclosed by Australian adherence to the UN, it became clear that the 
diplomatic benefits of support for the UK were becoming increasingly outweighed by 
those reaped in the UN arena. This need to attain influence on the international stage 
in order to secure Australian interests was the driving force behind the construction of 
an Australian Palestine Policy. 
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Conclusion 
 
The international resolution of the Palestine Question was mired in the reluctance of 
the world community to come to a conclusion on what had been deemed an 
irresolvable conflict. Great Power machinations hindered proceedings as Britain and 
the United States, the two Great Powers most involved in Palestine, became 
increasingly concerned with the emergence of the Cold War and attempted to 
circumvent the findings of the United Nations. It was Australia that time and time 
again emerged at the forefront of discussions in order to propel the UN to firstly 
arrive at a just conclusion and secondly to enforce its original decisions. By reading 
the Palestine Question back into the history of Australia‘s postwar foreign policy, this 
thesis has uncovered the underlying principles that drove Australian policy makers to 
emerge as leaders in the UN discussions on Palestine. 
 
The involvement of Australia in the international resolution of the Palestine Question 
was not an organic development. The seeds had already been sown at the San 
Francisco Conference to establish a new international organisation. The growing 
importance of the international sphere motivated Australian diplomats to consistently 
seek representation on issues that bore no direct relevance to Australia on the 
presumption that participating in the United Nations would allow Australia to garner 
diplomatic capital with which Australia‘s voice could be heard internationally. My 
study of the correspondence amongst Australian diplomats and between these 
diplomats and their British and American counterparts, as well as official documents 
from the period, however, shows that participation in the United Nations was not only 
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predicated on a pragmatic consideration of Australia‘s interests but also on an 
idealistic understanding that world peace would be best assured through the just 
resolution of conflict. This balance of pragmatism and idealism culminated in 
Australian diplomats fighting to uphold the legitimacy of the United Nations by 
consistently advocating the need for due process and the importance of maintaining 
the original decisions of the world body that had been arrived at after full 
investigation and deliberation.  
 
It is also true that the Australian position on the Palestine Question was formulated 
with a consideration of what was upheld by those same diplomats as key Australian 
interests. These interests were often shaped by the Chifley Government‘s estimation 
of the tolerance of the Australian people, to the exclusion of the minor internal Jewish 
lobby. For example, an immediate concern was the need to protect both the theoretical 
and legal basis of White Australia by maintaining the right of states to claim domestic 
jurisdiction, as well as to ensure its practical application by preventing the migration 
of Jewish refugees into the country. Similarly, an understanding of the wishes of the 
rather large Catholic constituency clearly shone through in key moments of 
Australia‘s involvement in the settlement of the Palestine Question. Through their 
involvement in the international proceedings, Australian diplomats were able to 
manoeuvre around these issues in a manner that accorded well with Australian 
interests.   
 
Although the UN formed the crux of the Australian conception of the new world 
order, the relationships of Australia with the US and particularly Britain were also 
kept clearly in mind. Where there was no conflict between British requests and the 
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resolutions of the UN, Australian policy makers were keen to maintain favourable 
relations with their traditional ally, based on the understanding that an Australian-
British alliance would confer diplomatic benefits onto Australia. Importantly, even as 
the UK remained a significant domain for Australian policy makers, the UN was 
considered the key forum in which the views of Australia would be heard. From the 
beginning of the international consideration of the Palestine Question, Australian 
diplomats displayed their willingness to defend the principles of the UN to the 
detriment of relations with the UK, a willingness that was emboldened by the historic 
partition decision which substantiated the Australian position.  
 
Australian diplomats propagated their views on the Palestine Question with great 
vigour although it was a problem far removed from the great majority of Australian 
society. At key moments, the official Australian stance reflected a unique conception 
of the relevance of the new world order for Australia and the keen desire to secure a 
voice in international affairs. Through a refined analysis of the Australian 
involvement in this incident, the Palestine Question can be written into the history of 
Australia‘s entry into the postwar forum of international politics and a burgeoning 
twentieth century ‗international society.‘ 
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